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GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
  
Public policies and reforms are made at an increasing pace in countries around the world and 
policy-makers and managers are challenged to take action and evaluate the impact of such 
trajectories of change. The realm of such reforms are represented by complex and dynamic public 
administrative systems where scope, organization and culture are different, but often policies and 
managerial actions are similar or at least convergent in cluster of countries characterized by 
common social and political culture (OECD, 1997; Kickert, 1997; Torres, 2004). Indeed, since the 
1980s a wide and comprehensive reform process transforming the role of governments, introducing 
managerial practices and quasi-market mechanisms has been the hallmark of public sector evolution 
among developed countries (Hood, 1991). The main overarching themes often referred to New 
Public Management (NPM) umbrella have focused on disaggregation, competition and 
performance-based incentives (Dunleavy et al., 2006).  
 
This is also the case of public healthcare sector reforms occurred during the last decades in the 
European continental countries under the impulse of NPM influence, where reform trajectories 
aimed at increasing the level of efficiency, transparency and accountability of healthcare service 
delivery (Ferlie et al., 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). A large literature in the field has 
addressed questions about the nature of such a phenomena, the scope, the reasons, and the effects 
(Hood and Peters, 2004). However, the empirical bases for such studies appears unbalanced 
(Ongaro, 2009), skewed towards examples from Anglo-Saxon or North European countries and 
with emphasis on general country-level or cross-country reform trajectories rather than sector 
specific dynamics.  
 
This work focuses on macro-level analysis of healthcare sector reform trajectories in the Italian 
National Healthcare Service (INHS) carried out on the basis of NPM principles - or managerial 
practice. Among others, two basic conceptual frameworks are adopted (Hood, 1991; Dunleavy 
1997): the disaggregation or decentralization framework (the extent and forms in which the 
trajectory is characterized by the redefinition of public sector hierarchies, moving toward 
administrative fragmentation and decentralization of roles and responsibilities) and the competition 
and coordination framework (the extent and forms in which the trajectory is characterized by the 
introduction of purchaser/provider separation into public structures and an increased, or decreased, 
level of specialization, both in terms of number of tasks and in terms of policy functions - 
formulation, execution, evaluation - and the set of instruments for coordination and their underlying 
mechanisms, specifically market-type mechanisms). 
 
More specifically, for the purpose of my dissertation I present three studies: the first essay considers 
the evolution of Italian healthcare sector through decentralization and re-centralization of action to 
address inefficient regional financial performance. The case of the introduction of formal financial 
recovery plans (Piani di Rientro) is presented and their effectiveness discussed by conducting semi-
structured interviews to informed policy makers and healthcare managers in three extreme regional 
cases. The second essay describes the additional challenges healthcare sector is facing due to the 
current economic, financial and fiscal crisis and the cut-back management strategies and tools that 
were implemented among European healthcare systems. This contribution aims at presenting what 
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measures (i.e., strategic and managerial approaches) during the crisis were adopted in order to meet 
stricter budgetary constraints in publicly funded healthcare systems by surveying top managers 
across ten European countries. Finally, the third essay analyses inpatient hospital outsourcing 
decision as a cost-containment strategy to influence public healthcare service provision, where 
emphasis is placed on the scale of public organization actions. Using a longitudinal panel-data set of 
Italian hospital inpatient service the essay supports and advances previous literature about the costly 
mix of public and private provision of public services, thus partially contradicting the general NPM 
statement of enhanced system performance after the inclusion of competition among providers.  
 
The dissertation work is structured as follow. First, I present the conceptual framework of analysis 
of NPM-style reform trajectories in healthcare sector around which I develop my contributions and 
situate them in relation to the distinctive features of the INHS. Then I present the methodological 
section where the research’s design adopted in the different essays, including main questions, units 
and levels of analysis, the approach, the sampling and the data collection or data generation are 
described. Following this general overview, I provide the full text of the three essays written during 
the doctoral program and presented to international conferences. I conclude my work by providing 
general concluding remarks and highlighting avenues for future research. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
New Public Management (NPM) has been seen as the way forward to rid the public sector of the 
inefficiencies of bureaucracies by exposing it to the economic rationalities of the market (Hood, 
1991) and simultaneously oblige public bureaucracies to act more responsively towards their 
citizens (Pollitt and Bouckeart, 2011). The literature recognizes the development of NPM into a 
theory of managerial change based on importing into the public sector central concepts from 
modern business practices and public choice theory (OECD, 1995). Indeed, emphasis is placed on 
emulating the private sector management practices with a focus on continuous quality 
improvement, strategic management, performance management, and entrepreneurial leadership 
(Diamond and Liddle, 2012) to obtain improved performance. As a result, it is common that some 
conceptions assimilate NPM into strongly normative concepts (Dunleavy et al., 2006), where the 
aspiration is the “well performing organization”. 
Overall, NPM doctrines entail a radical alteration in public sector organizations culture and 
structure, impacting on processes, organizational outputs, and overall social, economic and political 
outcomes. While only a few countries have fully embraced NPM, many of them have tried out 
specific NPM techniques, applied to different policy sectors. The main overarching themes in NPM 
can be summarized as the bundle of specific concepts such as disaggregation, competition and 
performance-based incentives (Dunleavy et al., 2006), or following Ferlie’s categorization (Ferlie et 
al.,1996) managerialisation, markets and quasi-markets mechanisms and performance measurement. 
In this work the attention is posed to the first two concepts: disaggregation of units in the public 
sector and competition/coordination through market-type mechanisms. 
The general term of disaggregation is used to indicate the redefinition of public sector hierarchies, 
moving toward administrative fragmentation and decentralization of roles and responsibilities, 
through the disintegration of vertically integrated bureaucracies with the creation of arm’s length 
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executive agencies (Hood, 1991; Dunleavy, 1997). Indeed, the reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s 
had tended to fragment public sector organizations, producing fewer larger, multi-purpose forms 
and more single organizations, each perusing more explicitly defined sets of goals and targets 
(Bouckeart et al., 2010). Also, the process of fragmentation produced the spread of formal authority 
from smaller to a larger number of actors creating strong territorial decentralization through the 
introduction of intermediate levels. A special case of decentralization is devolution of power. We 
refer to devolution of power when formal authority is given to external legally established 
organizations run by elected representatives, usually occurring from higher to lower levels of 
government (Sherwood, 1969; Rondinelli, 1981). In the case of the healthcare sector, decisional 
power is often transferred to geographic units of local government that lie outside the formal 
command structure of the central government (i.e., to Regions in Italy or Comunidad Autonoma in 
Spain) with the aspiration to increase systems’ microeconomic efficiency and financial 
responsibility.  
Another slogan that achieved wide circulation among NPM style reform is the promotion of 
competition in service organization and delivery through outsourcing. More specifically, it refers to 
the introduction of contracting-out forms with purchaser and provider separation into public 
structures so as to allow multiple forms of provision to be developed and to create (more) 
competition among potential providers. This implies that the bureaucratic failure of the public 
sector in handling particular transactions can be more efficiently organized through the market 
(Ferlie, 1992). This organizational change also promotes the basis for a broader diffusion of power 
within public service and thus ensures control over public organizations (Hood, 1998). In the 
healthcare sector, the call for entrepreneurial government – one that promotes competition between 
providers – is reflected by the development of quasi-market mechanisms through large-scale 
contracting-out and market-testing or contractual appointments to purchase and/or deliver medical 
and non-medical inputs. More specifically, contracting-out in the public sector is often 
conceptualized as the process through which the production and/or delivery of healthcare services 
are transferred outside the boundaries of direct public provision but the government retains control 
over the specification of the service, the management of the contract and the evaluation of the 
service provider’s performance (Jensean and Stonecash, 2005).  
The two abovementioned reform trends are peculiar to several healthcare system across Europe, 
especially Beveridge-based health systems described by National Health System taxation, centrally 
organized and relying predominantly on public providers such as the British NHS and the Italian 
NHS (INHS) (Saltman and Figueras 1997), even though their outcomes are a mixture of 
overarching intentional design and localized adaptation (Painter, 2001). In general, the move 
towards decentralization and contracting-out are justified by increased level of organizational and 
financial responsibilities at lower levels (more close to citizens) coupled with better response to 
local healthcare needs, and greater efficiency gains due to induced competition in public service 
provision (Torres, 2004). The expected results of such reforms are believed to contain public 
expenditures, while maintaining quality of service provision and increase citizen satisfaction. The 
emphasis on cost-containment is great. However, the literature also provides evidence of potential 
downturns of decentralization and contracting-out arrangements, such as rapid organizational 
change and lack of adequate information, over regulation and slow implementation of new market 
mechanisms are pinpoint to hamper the potentials of decentralized decision-making and competitive 
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relationships between providers (Bennett and Ferlie, 1996; Vininga and Globemanb, 1999). 
Notwithstanding these limitations the example of decentralization or devolution of responsibilities 
and contract based competitive provision are well documented in the Italian NHS.  
1The INHS was established in 1978 by replacing a system based on multiple social health insurance 
funds and was modelled after the British NHS with provision of universal coverage largely free of 
charge at the point of service. However, despite full implementation in early 1980s, some major 
weaknesses of the health system were evident, namely the lack of financial control by the central 
government over expenditure, the over-politicization of system organizations, the frequent conflicts 
between the three political tiers of government and the lack of specific management systems and 
expertise to run health care organizations (Ferrera 1995; Mapelli 1999; Fattore 1999; Borgonovi, 
2001; France and Taroni, 2005). During a critical political juncture in 1992 the government had the 
opportunity to design and approve major changes to the system (Law N. 421/92; Decree Law N. 
502/92; Decree Law N. 517/93). This legislative reform included managerial components and 
efforts to devolve health care powers to lower organizational level (the regions) reflecting major 
NPM principles. More specifically, the system first started a process of regionalization or 
devolution of power by virtually eliminating the role of municipalities and reducing the powers of 
the national tier in favour of the 19 regions and 2 autonomous provinces; second, managerialism or 
private sector style of management practice were put in place (e.g., appointed politicians were 
substituted by professional managers as heads of INHS organizations and use of performance-based 
payments); and third, quasi-market or contracting-out of service provision were established (see 
Annex 1 for a detailed historical summary of background and recent reforms in the INHS). 
As a result, the 1992 reform introduced regionalization as the new institutional arrangements that 
reshaped hierarchies and power in the healthcare arena. The model envisaged was that the national 
level would define equal level of public service throughout the county and would ensure that 
regions received adequate resources to deliver it. Conversely, regions were mandated to provide the 
nationally guaranteed services, and would have to use their own resources if they were unable to do 
so due to inefficiencies or if they wanted to provide additional services beyond those specified in 
the national basic package. Accordingly, regions are free to reallocate the funds received within 
different programmes, and assign spending duties to local health authorities (Aziende Sanitarie 
Locali – ASL)2 or hospitals enterprise (Azienda Ospedaliera AOs). The regionalization or 
disaggregation of care to 21 different regional contexts aimed at increase regions’ competencies and 
responsibilities over healthcare organization/planning and delivery. In fact, different regions have 
made different choices on how to use their increasing autonomy.  
For instance, most regions decided to keep an “ASL-centred template”, with most hospitals 
remaining under ASL control and few becoming AOs while, a few smaller regions in northern and 
central Italy (i.e., Valle d’Aosta, Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano / Trento and Molise) adopted a 
“Region-centred template”, where the region directly control the provision of services. Moreover at 
one extreme, Lombardy region opted for a full-fledged experiments in which all inpatient and 
outpatient services are delivered by AOs or other providers (private or private accredited) while the 
1 The description of the organization of the INHS and major reforms draws on the work published in the Italian Country HiT Profile 
2014 written for the WHO/ European Observatory on Health System and Policy together with De Belvis A.G., Valerio L., Longhi S., 
Lazzari A.,  Fattore G., Ricciardi W. and Maresso A.   
2Local health authorities are funded mainly through capitated budgets. 
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ASL acts as solo purchaser of services and provider of preventive and territorial care. Because of 
these regional differences in organization and delivery, a large vertical fragmentation exists in the 
extent and the quality of such strategies between regions or ASLs of excellence, which are mainly 
found in the northern part of the country, and areas where self-directed initiatives are scant.  
However, the underline idea of the reform was of an “equality of treatment” for all citizens coupled 
with the traditional emphasis on the coordination of the state action to serve l’intérêt general as a 
common feature to many Southern European countries influenced by structure inherited from the 
French legal model (Torres, 2004). Thus, the state is still considered to be the main facilitator of 
solutions to problems, so that the traditional Weberian elements have been preserved (Pollitt, van 
Thiel and Homburg, 2007). This remained clear even under the major 2001 Constitutional reform 
(Constitutional Law N. 3/2001), which redistributed legislative competences between the national 
government and regional governments3 – including fiscal devolution (Law No. 42/2009) – framing 
a quasi-federal arrangement for the Italian state. In financial terms general taxation pays a 
complementary role (through an equalization fund4) and resources are mainly collected at regional 
level through regional taxes supplemented by co-payments for pharmaceuticals and outpatient 
care5.  
From this perspective, there is still a notable trend for the national government to assume an 
increasing steering role and oversight of regional financial performance, putting the disaggregation 
component clearly at stake and showing high potential of reversal or roll-back where “the 
reintegration of government into more coherent public sector or government-wide process” 
(Dunleavy et al., 2006: 470) is expected. This is well illustrated by a recent development that 
established compulsory financial recovery plans for regions suffered from severe financial deficits 
because of their health care spending.  
In light of this phenomenon the first Essay included in this dissertation “The challenge and the 
future of health care turnaround plans: evidence from the Italian experience” provides an overall 
picture of the evolution of Italian healthcare system through decentralization and re-centralization 
of action to address inefficient regional financial performance. In the light of NPM principles, a 
shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector (Hood, 1991) and decentralization is perceived 
as a mean to increase microeconomic efficiency and financial responsibility. However, the INHS is 
decentralized in its organizations but not yet fully financial autonomous. Over time, some regional 
healthcare systems incurred considerable deficits and were not able to individually recover their 
expenditure balance. Traditionally, the central government would bail out regions that had a 
negative health expenditure to revenue ratio. But starting in 2006 to address regional financial 
failures the government introduced a special regime for overspending regions (annual deficits above 
3 The “right to health” was assigned by Constitution to the joint competence of the state and regions and as a result, regions gained 
wide legislative autonomy in the field of health and stronger fiscal responsibilities (Law 405/2001), with the national government 
retaining the authority to define the general framework. Although, in the years following the Constitutional reform, agreements 
between the national government and regional governments, such as the three-year Pacts for Health agreed upon by the Joint State-
Regions Conference, have become the main instrument of health policy, the agenda has been increasingly taken over by the need to 
better control regional health care expenditure. 
4 Its main role now is to assure that each Region can count on receiving roughly the same level of adjusted per-capita funding to 
provide, at minimum, the core health benefit package (LEA). Resources are mainly distributed to Regions with narrower tax bases, 
i.e. those with lower per-capita income. 
5 In the INHS, public financing accounts for 78.2% of total health spending, while 21.8% is privately financed, through out-of-pocket 
(OOP) payments (17.8%), especially for pharmaceuticals, outpatient care and dental services, voluntary health insurance coverage 
(0.9%) and non-profit institutions serving households (3.1%) (2012 data). 
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7% of total funding) that requires the adoption and implementation of formal regional financial 
recovery plans (Piani di Rientro). Piani di Rientro are negotiated financial recovery plans agreed 
upon by the central government and the regional administrations instigated to restore financial 
stability and to address the structural determinants of the organizational failures and cost over-runs. 
Since 2007, ten6 out of the twenty-one regional health systems have adopted these plans, which 
include actions to address the structural determinants of costs. The overall effect of this regime has 
been a decrease in the yearly level of overspending and in 2012, the total deficit of the public health 
care sector was €1.04 billion, declining by 77% since 2006 (Armeni and Ferré, 2013).  
This process sets out a new collaborative agenda between national government and the respective 
regions, with disciplinary consequences for non-compliance. It has also enabled increased 
governmental interference in regions’ autonomy to fund and plan health care services. Based on a 
qualitative study, we advance an interpretation on the value and effectiveness of Piani di Rientro. 
We propose an interpretative framework to understand the advantages and disadvantages of 
financial recovery plans, and we apply the findings to the development of policy recommendations 
for the structure, methods, processes and contexts of the implementation of this tool. 
Decoupling policy systems seems to come to a halt especially because of some contextual 
macroeconomic factors, thus the reform trajectory is slowly reversing and healthcare systems across 
Europe are restructuring to foster more integrated focus, with relatively high levels of continued 
central direction (Dunleavy et al., 2006). Indeed, over time in a context of fiscal austerity, the 
reconfiguration of powers between the national and regional governments has created a shift of 
power at national level from the health ministry to the central finance ministry. While most policy 
powers are in the hands of decentralized units, the need for expenditure control strengthens the role 
of central governments (Mladvosky et al., 2012; Thomson et al., 2014) with reintegration practices 
that represent an antithetical response to the NPM thesis. These reasons have, of course, redoubled 
since the advent of the global financial crisis of 2007-20087. For instance, in the Italian context the 
Ministry of Economics and Finance (MOEF) now directly monitors health care expenditure and has 
direct powers over regions which overrun their budgets, and, together with the Ministry of Health, 
establishes contingent cost-containment measures on public health expenditure level (e.g., caps on 
specific spending areas) and higher co-payments for outpatient/ambulatory care, diagnostics and, 
adding to private spending on health8.  
On this issue, the recent history of health care expenditure among European countries is marked by 
attempts to place stricter control over health spending for macroeconomic reasons and towards 
action improving efficiency gains levels. Financial management reforms have been widespread and 
have led to an expansion of the scope and purpose of budgeting and financial management with a 
shift towards a New Public Management model, where the emphasis is on savings and efficiency 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). However, the reforms which have served the savings objectives have 
not always fitted well with the reforms that would be required to encourage performance 
improvement. For example, the case of governmental “cheese-slicing” expenditure approach, or 
6 Piedmont, Liguria, Abruzzo, Molise, Lazio, Campania, Puglia, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia. 
7 A decline of 3.3% in gross domestic product (GDP) per person PPP in 2009 (WHO, 2014). 
8 Since 2009, under pressure from the international financial crisis and amid increasing political instability, government interventions 
in the INHS have taken the form of either urgent decrees or entries in the annual state budget law rather than systematic reforms, and 
have mostly consisted of cuts to public expenditure (de Belvis et al., 2012). 
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across-the-board tactics, as a reaction from central cabinets to evenly cut programme and service 
from the top down (Mladvosky et al., 2012). Among the variety of approaches to manage austerity 
and fiscal stress in public sector, Pollitt (2010) and Pollitt and Bouckeart (2011) identify additional 
basic measures besides opportunistic cheese-slicing, such as strategic cuts and productivity or 
efficiency gains. The most basic distinction is between across-the-board and productivity gains, 
where the former are interpreted as the “traditional” response of linear cuts across sectors and 
programs, while at the opposite efficiency gains require deploying a consistent reform strategy, 
often including a mix of provisions, such as setting priorities in services provision and user needs, 
using non-service approaches, building new relationships and creating alliances, exploiting 
technological innovation, and others. Another route to savings, perhaps more compatible with 
performance improvement, is the adoption or increase the use of block-budgeting and the 
application of strategic or targeted cuts. Here the central ministry sets polices and broad ceilings 
(frames), but within those delegates responsibility for allocation to particular services, programmes, 
or projects to local politicians and/or manager. This approach somehow permits the local 
determination of priorities.  
However, it is important to bear in mind that the cutback tactics described above may differ across 
countries, depending on government structure and organizational priorities, general level of 
economic development of the country and other environmental factors (like the severity and 
duration of fiscal distress)9 (van de Walle and Jilke, 2012; Raudla, Savi and Randma-Liiv, 2013). In 
addition, contemporary behaviours are often constrained and structured by the aggregation of past 
actions and decisions even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant (“the power of past 
decision”). Thus, selection of cut back policies has multiple explanatory factors and the existing 
empirical studies point to mixed evidence (Raudla, Savi and Randma-Liiv, 2013), suggesting that 
decision-makers tend to cut those parts of the budget that are more controllable and where public 
opposition are minimized (Bartle, 1996; Pammer 1990).  
On this debate the second Essay - “The fiscal crisis in the health sector: patterns of response by 
public managers across Europe” - systematically presents the results of a European-wide survey on 
the pro-cyclical approaches adopted by public managers to tackle the shrinkage of funds buffeting 
the health care sector, as a consequence of the ongoing financial, economic and fiscal crises. Since 
2009 health spending trends across European countries has slowed markedly or fallen in many 
countries after years of continuous growth. On average in European OECD countries, per-capita 
health spending over the period 2000-2009 is estimated to have grown, in real terms, by 4.1% 
annually, in stark contrast over the subsequent two years (2009-11) where expenditure grew at only 
0.2% as the effects of the economic crisis (OECD, 2013). The extent of the slowdown has varied 
considerably across countries, with some affected harder than others given their pre-existing 
macroeconomic conditions (Greece, Ireland and Estonia). In the Italian context, total health 
9 On this point, the literature suggest that the longer-lasting and the more severe fiscal distress is, the more likely it is that the 
authorities start imposing targeted cuts rather than across-the-board measures (Levine, 1979, 1985; Hood and Wright, 1981). Levine 
(1979, p. 182) argues that at the beginning of the austerity, across-the-board cuts are more likely (as the “sharing the pain” option is 
likely to be perceived as more equitable and hence to generate less conflict and resistance), but if these measures are not sufficient, 
more targeted cuts on the basis of prioritization will be adopted (Hood and Wright, 1981; Pollitt, 2010). Similarly, in their 
“administrative response model” of cutback budgeting, Levine, Rubin and Wolohojian (1981) predict that governments would 
respond to fiscal stress in a systematic way, depending on the duration and severity of fiscal stress. They conjecture that in initial 
phases of revenue-decline, the cutbacks would be decremental, but the larger and longer-lasting the revenue declines are, the more 
likely the adoption of targeted cuts becomes (see also Klase, 2011). 
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expenditure (public and private) grew at a yearly average of 4.7% from 2000 to 2009 and by only 
0.9% from 2009 to 2012. Also, the ration of Italian total health expenditure over country GDP has 
increased by 1.3 percentage points of GDP since 2000 (from 7.7% in 2000 to 9% in 2010), mainly 
because the public component has experienced rates of increase that are substantially higher than 
GDP. Only in the last three years (2010-2012) has the increase in public health care expenditure 
been radically contained; thus, the ratio of total health care expenditure to GDP has been stabilized 
(Figure 1)10. In 2012, the country’s health spending (9.2%) was almost on par with the EU average 
(9.6%) after being one of the lowest spenders between 1900 to 2012, along with Spain and the 
United Kingdom among Europe, but from 2009, most of the countries in this group have seen a 
decline in expenditure and have converged around the EU average.  
Figure 1 Trends in health expenditure as a share (%) of GDP in country and selected countries, 1990 
to latest available year (2012). 
 
Source: WHO Health For All, 2014 
To cope with decreasing level of resources, during the last five years, governments across Europe 
adopted pro-cyclical approaches to the global financial crisis advocate reducing public spending and 
achieving savings in times of financial constraints, in contrast to counter-cyclical approaches that 
advocate public spending to boost the economy (Armingeon, 2012). Specifically, interventions have 
taken the form of urgent decrees in the annual state budget law and have mostly consisted of hiring 
freezes, cuts to existing programs and postponing or cancelling new healthcare programmes. From 
the data collected the study highlights how some policy tools turned out to be more frequently 
deployed than others: targeted cuts and proportional cuts were the two more popular approaches, 
followed by productivity and efficiency savings. Using multinomial logistic regression, the 
empirical analysis suggests to what extent respondents organizational characteristics, the healthcare 
institutional arrangements (whether Bismark or Beverlide-like model) and trend of available public 
healthcare resources are predictors of selecting one of the possible alternative cutback approaches. 
Moreover, the study include the descriptive analysis of what concrete measures and tools countries 
introduced in the healthcare sector to cope with the crisis. 
Considering the case of the Italian healthcare sector and its cut back strategies during the current 
economic crisis, we acknowledge that, already during 2007-2009, the central government had 
10 It is important to highlight that since the early 1990s Italian GDP has grown substantially less compared to the rest of Europe. 
Consequently, important increases in the share of GDP for healthcare were driven by moderate increases in absolute spending. 
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increased its efforts to contain costs, especially by strengthen control over total expenditure and 
make use of sanctions to ensure that regions do not overspend. More recently, more stringent cost-
containment measures have been introduced and they directly operate on the sources of regional 
spending (input costs) through measures on the payment of personnel, recruitment, standards for 
hospital care (e.g., minimum size of hospitals). Also, decremental policy on the overall public 
healthcare funding have been approved (e.g., Decree Law n. 201/2011 reduced total public health 
financing by €900 million in 2012, €1.8 billion in 2013 and a further €2 billion in 2014) and this 
reduction in central funding was compensated for primarily by higher co-payments and cost-saving 
measures to reduce pharmaceutical expenditures. Cost-containment measures also targeted the 
expenditure side: the government decreased expenditure for goods and services (primarily targeting 
drugs and purchasing of medical equipment)11 and outsourcing expenditures to accredited private 
providers. 
On this last point, I have previously introduced how the 1992 reform to the INHS designed also a 
quasi-market (where markets replace firms) for hospital and specialist care to control spending and 
ensure value for money (technical efficiency) but also to potentially improve consumer choice 
(allocative efficiency) (Ferlie, 1992). The quasi-market model envisaged in the Italian context is 
based on three main principles (Fattore 1999; Anessi-Pessina and Cantù, 2006; France and Taroni, 
2005): firstly, patients are given complete freedom to choose any public healthcare provider (even 
outside their region) without the need for prior authorization; secondly, private organizations are 
included in this competitive arena provided that they are accredited by the region in which they 
operated. Indeed, regions have to set accreditation criteria to identify providers (public and private) 
that respect minimum quality criteria/rules of compliance (accreditation). Thirdly, a fee-for service 
payment system (for outpatient specialist care) and a DRGs system (for inpatient hospital care) is 
introduced (Taroni, 1996; Fattore and Torbica, 2006). Therefore, the INHS, at least in theory, 
established a fair playing field between public and private providers in the healthcare sector. Also, 
on paper, the quasi-market system designed by the reform was rather radical as it is based on the 
free choice of providers (including private ones) by patients and strong incentives to increase 
volumes, fill hospital capacity and reduce length-of-stay. As such, the Italian reform was different 
to that introduced within the British NHS under Margaret Thatcher which was based on contractual 
arrangements between purchasers and providers and did not include official tariff systems.  
However, the Italian legislation did not make clear reference to a purchasing. Subsequently, a 
politically driven legislation (Legislative Decree n. 229/1999) introduced measures aimed at 
regulating and promoting purchasing, where the public sector become primarily a funder, 
purchasing services from a variety of private, public and voluntary providers, in competition with 
each other (Ferlie, 1992), thus producing incentives for specialization. Also, funding was no longer 
to be allocated solely through planning or formula funding, but instead through tariff reimbursement 
or earmarked budget allocated between competitive providers. As a result, regional healthcare 
systems could either directly purchase services or delegate the function to their local health 
11 A major policy to contain pharmaceutical expenditure includes measures such as redefining the proportions of the total cost 
pertaining to pharmaceutical companies, wholesalers, and pharmacies; a progressive reduction of the cap on regional pharmaceutical 
expenditure in primary and community health care; a reduction of the prices of equivalent drugs, along with other measure to 
promote their use; and the introduction and progressive extension of the claw-back system which requires pharmaceutical companies 
to pay back increasing amounts of money to regions when the nationally-determined expenditure caps for pharmaceuticals are 
exceeded. Another example is the significant reduction in the expenditure caps on purchasing medical equipment and services by the 
INHS (2010 to 2013). 
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authorities (ASLs) and, depending on regional arrangements and local purchasing strategies, or 
purchase services from private accredited entities.  
It is common to distinguish three main purchaser-provider configurations in the INHS:  
1. An “ASL-centred template”, with each ASL acting as both provider and (to a limited extent) as 
purchaser of services from a limited number of AOs. This template partly resembles a quasi-market, 
as ASLs are financially penalized if residents seek care from providers other than theirs, as they 
have to pay them; 
2. A “Region-centred template”, where most purchasing concentrates at the regional level, while 
ASLs act mostly as providers. These regions directly control most public providers, and they 
accredit only a limited number of private providers; 
3. The case of Lombardy, which is the only region that has carried out a complete purchaser-
provider split. Most hospitals have been taken out of ASL control and established as AOs. ASLs 
purchase services from public and private providers, while the region has a regulatory role. The 
incentive for ASLs to ensure financial control by limiting provision balances the incentive for 
providers to increase volumes by attracting patients, who have full freedom of choice. However, 
inadequate governance of demand makes ASLs act more often as third-party payers than 
purchasers, and volume-driven profits have led hospitals to increase demand artificially (Cantu`et 
al., 2010).  
As a result, since the introduction of this quasi-market mechanism, there has been a clearer split 
between the responsibility of buying healthcare i.e. “purchasers” from the provision of services i.e. 
“providers” within the Italian regional health service, representing a fundamental move away from 
exclusive public provision and implying profound implications for the preferred organizational 
form (i.e., make-or-buy). The theoretical foundation of outsourcing decision are rooted in new 
institutional economics or Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), closely associated with the work of 
Williamson (1973; 1979) which argues that firms have two alternatives opportunities for organizing 
their production structure: they may find convenience in exploiting specialization economies 
(market structure) or in reducing transaction costs (hierarchical structure).  
Williamson suggests that market governance is the most efficient organizational form unless the 
transactions costs in the market are higher than the transactions costs incurred by operating within 
the firm. The activities are, therefore, allocated to the most appropriate executor (market vs. 
hierarchy) and are defined according to “the efficient boundary for which own supply can be shown 
to be the efficient choice” (Williamson, 1973: 557), meaning that activities are assigned to the one 
that minimize transaction costs (including among others search and information costs, organization 
and coordination costs, enforcement costs). Thus, transaction is the basic unit of analysis and 
alternatives are evaluated with respect to production, bargaining and opportunistic costs where the 
theoretical objective is an efficient configuration more than a social or political effective action.  
However, bounded rationality and operationalization problems limit the rationality to TCE approach 
for solving strategic dependencies, since it suffers from not adequately exploring other factors, 
which are intrinsically manifested in the make-or-buy decision (e.g., governance structure, 
reputation, power and trust present in any inter-organizational relationship) (Ring and Van de Ven, 
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1992). Moreover, in the case of public funded hospital, make-or-buy decision are particularly 
challenging, because of the characteristics of the service provided (public, non-rival with high 
levels of uncertainty), the professionals involved (highly specialize and autonomous), the type of 
consumer engaged (highly risk averse) and the non-business like governance structure of the sector 
where institutional changes must be seen as profoundly political process. Thus, an additional aspect 
when evaluating make-or-buy trade-off in public service organizations is the inclusion of 
organizational costs or the cost of managing complexity, changing organizational settings and 
functions which are highly dependent on political influence and past behaviours (path dependency). 
In outsourcing decisions become particularly crucial the definition of contractual arrangements, 
where transactions are managed by contract and not exclusively by hierarchy. Thus, a key 
development within the public sector is the emergence of formalized system of contracts, structured 
with an emphasis on legal rules and recourse to litigation as a means of resolving contractual 
disputes (classical or neoclassical contract law) (Mcneil, 1977). This is true for the INHS, where 
purchaser-provider relationship is managed under a contractual agreement stating the volume, price, 
quality of the services to be delivered (usually renegotiated every year) and set the fundamental 
rules of compliance, following the principle of formal contracting in governing transaction (Ring 
and van de Ven, 1992), leaving to the market incentives guiding the behaviour of public and private 
providers. However, since 1997, regions have gradually reinforced “hierarchies” and “institutions” 
to supplement and correct market incentives (Anessi-Pessina et al., 2004). 
In addition, in the second half of 2000s, given the cost-containment pressure on the healthcare 
system there has been a good deal of concern over the balance between public and private 
provision. Regions adopted a more stringent role in differentiating fees across classes of providers 
(i.e., between public and private providers or between teaching and non-teaching hospitals) and 
introduced provider-specific funding ceilings to contain expenditure and limit incentives for volume 
increases for specific sets of services (Jommi et al., 2001; Cantù et al., 2010). As a result, Italian 
regional health systems have gradually included planning and control systems – as supplementary 
managerial tools to contacting – to predefine the volumes, mix, prices and possibly other features, 
like waiting times and quality, to be offered by each provider. Over time, these systems have 
become increasingly top-down, with a more stringent regulatory framework, and focused on the 
financial dimension of performance due to budget constraints.  
The third Essay- “Unattainable cost efficiency. Interpreting public sector outsourcing decisions: 
evidence from hospital inpatient service”, specifically aims at exploring the evolution of 
contracting-out or outsourcing decisions as a strategy to contain public expenditure in the Italian 
context. However, while NPM may hold the promise of improved performance, there have already 
been several examples of less than optimal political and organisational outcomes when its principles 
manifest themselves in private sector managerial strategies (Ferlie, 1992; Enthoven, 2004; Zullo, 
2008; Levin and Tadelis, 2010). This is also the case of outsourcing in the INHS, where real-world 
constraints (especially organizational costs) hinder such efficient configurations, which remain de 
facto unattainable.  
To approach the effectiveness of outsourcing strategies played by the different regional health 
systems, the study advances the theory by distinguishing two forms of public outsourcing (i.e., 
contracting out to a public provider) and private outsourcing (i.e., contracting out to a private 
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provider), thus, identifying a variety of possible service delivery configurations depending on the 
nature of the contracted entity, thus challenging the commonly held view of outsourcing as a 
dichotomous choice. In fact, over time, regional health systems have included some internal market 
mechanisms of outsourcing of inpatient service provision, but at different degree and with multiple 
configurations over time even though regions appear to be still predominantly public-service based 
(i.e., direct provision of hospital services through local health authority-managed hospitals). Some 
regions have included some level of public outsourcing by contacting a share of hospital beds to 
public independent hospital, or have introduced private outsourcing by contracting a share of 
hospital beds owned by private accredited hospitals and for which a reimbursement contract has 
been signed with the region or with the local health authority (according to the regional institutional 
setting).  
Among the 21 regional health systems, only Lazio, Campania, Molise and Lombardy present a 
rather high level of private outsourcing, with 30% of total hospitalization supplied by private 
providers (Ministry of Health, 2012). In this setting, organization such hospitals have been under 
pressure to adopt many characteristics of a quasi-firm market (Ferlie, 1992). They started 
determining their own competitive strategy in response to local “market” conditions by attracting 
business by hiring reputable professionals (i.e., status competition), developing marketing strategies 
and by reducing costs and raising quality. While other regional systems, especially in the south, 
greatly limited the extent of competitive forces and the use of tariff systems to fund providers 
(Cantù and Carbone, 2007). 
The essay, using longitudinal data also argues that both public and private outsourcing have similar 
curvilinear independent effects on cost-containment (with a different magnitude of the quadratic 
terms) but that combining the two (intermediate configurations) is costly. This contribution also 
explains the existence and persistence of mixed configurations, or coexistence of both public 
outsourced inpatient service (e.g., to public managed hospital) and private outsourced service (e.g., 
to private reimbursed hospital) in the Italian context. This mixed configuration appears more costly, 
but it is justified on the basis of the specificity of the sector (e.g., the presence of institutional and 
political scrutiny) and its historical traditions, coupled with change-associated costs and smooth 
deviations from a status quo, and the ambiguous perceived effectiveness of different outsourcing 
decisions. 
Overall, the INHS 1990s reforms reshaped the organization and hierarchy of the healthcare system 
and reflected a series of incentives so to improve efficiency and responsiveness at the micro-level, 
while containing costs and ensuring equity at the macro level. While the reforms contained attempts 
to transform the INHS into a mixed system where decentralization and private initiatives could have 
put at risk some of the health system’s main principles, the overall endeavour to overhaul the 
system was also genuinely driven by the search to modernize the system in line with other major 
reforms in Europe. Especially, compared to other sectors of the Italian public administration, at 
least in the regions with stronger capacities, there has been dynamic both at regional and 
organizational level with new management roles and systems that have helped to govern the 
complexity of healthcare (Ongaro, 2009). 
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METHODS  
In my doctoral thesis, I used both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to better understand 
the complex process of healthcare policy and reforms occurred in the light of NPM tradition in the 
Italian and European context. Both research methodologies have been widely adopted in public 
management and policy tradition, where interpretation and explanation of social phenomena are two 
research traditions that are integrated in the literature. For the purpose of my research question, I am 
more interested in investigating process level phenomena with a holistic approach rather than 
organizational models or individual actions. Indeed, I investigate reform trends and their impact by 
adopting a macro-level or meso-level as defined by the Health Policy and System Research (HPSR) 
framework12, which is the general framework of reference used to look at the interactions between 
policy and systems (Sheik et al., 2011). Specifically, the macro-level refers to the architecture and 
oversight of systems while the meso-level focuses on the functioning of organizations and systemic 
interventions (Sheik et al., 2011). In management studies the meso-level relates to studying 
organization or institution (azienda or istituto) in which individuals act and behave according to a 
combination of procedural rules (e.g., managerial precepts), institutional structures or cultural 
norms defined and enclosed in their respective organization (Borgonovi, 2001). Moreover, 
organization behaviours are partially determined by external rules and, reciprocally, variables at the 
system level are influenced and shaped by organization behaviours. Essay 1 on financial recovery 
plans adopts the former, while Essay 2 on responses to the financial crisis and Essay 3 on 
outsourcing decision look at the meso-level, adopting countries or organizations as level of analysis. 
Research questions can also be classified according to their intent, which may broadly be seen to be 
either: normative/evaluative or descriptive/explanatory (Table 1). In the case of normative research 
or evaluative research, there is an intrinsic interpretative approach which may involve value 
judgement and explicitly defines how thing should or ought be (Robson, 2002). This is the case of 
Essay 1, where the effectiveness of financial recovery plans has been investigated by direct 
observation of the phenomenon using interviews and focus group of actors involved in the 
development and implementation of the strategic tool. An interpretative research approach has been 
favoured to explore and describe meanings and understand members’ definition of the situation 
(Gephart, 1999).  
On the other hand, Essay 2 and 3 adopt an empirical or positivistic approach, whether descriptive or 
explanatory. Compare to the interpretative approach, this implies that now the observer tends to be 
neutral and states the facts as they are without passing any judgment or making any analysis that 
may be biased because of personal leanings (unobtrusive approach) (Trochim, 2005). On the first 
level, descriptive research seek to give an accurate profile of situation or social phenomenon, while 
the more advanced explanatory research involves explaining patterns relating to the phenomenon 
being researched, often by illustrating the situation or problem in a form of a causal relationship 
(Robson, 2002). A descriptive approach is used in the display of primary data collected for Essay 2 
about cut-back measures implemented across European healthcare systems to confront the 
economic crisis. In addition, both Essay 2 and 3 develop an empirical section according to the 
explanatory tradition with the aim of verifying hypothesis involving valid, reliable and precisely 
12 HPSR is a multidisciplinary field through which social scientists seek to support change within health care systems 
emphasizing the pragmatic nature of the research questions and their instrumentalist perspective (Sheik et al., 2011).  
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measured variables (Gephart, 1999).  
Table 1 Study by level of analysis and intent of question 
Study Level of analysis Intent of question Essay 1 – Does financial recovery plan (Piano di 
Rientro) have shown its intended effect to address the structural causes of regional healthcare deficit?  
MACRO Explorative / Evaluative 
Essay 2 – The fiscal crisis in the health sector: patterns of cutback management across Europe? MESO Descriptive / Explanatory Essay 3 – How outsourcing hospital service to public and private providers have an effect on healthcare expenditures?  
MESO Explanatory 
In the following paragraphs more in-depth description of the research methodology applied to each 
of the three essays included in the thesis is provided.  
The first study is structured around a qualitative study aiming at understanding the effectiveness of 
the strategic tool of financial recovery plans (Piani di Rientro) introduced to restore regional 
healthcare deficit in the Italian context. The interpretative research framework allowed the 
gathering of thick data through analytical observations of informed subjects through semi-structured 
interviews. Twenty-five semi-structured interviewed were carried out in three regional contexts 
representing the regions that over time accounted for the highest cumulative deficit (i.e., Lazio, 
Campania and Sicilia). So, extreme cases were selected with the purpose of highlighting the highest 
variation in the phenomena under investigation rather than analyse typical or average instances 
(Denscombe, 2007). The sampling of interviewees was based on subjective selection or purpose 
sampling which aims at gather multiple observations from different key informants related to the 
three regional context selected. Specifically, I included both the promoters of such strategic and 
managerial tool (i.e., policy-makers), and the actual developers and users (i.e., external consultants, 
financial responsible from the regional health department and medical director from local health 
authorities). Thus, a heterogeneous group of subjects holding different role, hierarchic position, 
expertise, responsibilities and perception of the effectiveness of the tool were interviewed.  
The unit of analysis is the regional financial recovery plan and the actions undertook by the three 
selected regions to manage and restore their healthcare deficit. The unit of analysis is represented by 
the single interview. During the fieldwork, interviews were recorded and intersubjective testability 
(Singleton and Straits, 2005) was assured by the inclusion of two independent observers each time 
of information gathering and their coding. Interviews were analysed to discover categories, or more 
abstract concepts that represented both conditions and consequences of action related to the use of 
financial recovery plans in the three regional contexts. Moreover, to prepare for the fieldwork and 
to facilitate and strengthen the value of the direct observations a well-defined list of items among 
which to evaluate the effectiveness of such financial recovery plans was developed. The list of 
dimensions and elements exploring the effectiveness of financial recovery plan draws from the 
design properties of strategic plan literature (Pandit, 2000; Paton, 2004; Walshe et al., 2004; Boyne, 
2006) and includes among others endogenous and exogenous determinants that cause performance 
decline and strategies of (i) replacements (removal of key members of the leadership and 
management of the organization); (ii) retrenchment (or short-term actions to stabilize the 
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organization and (iii) repositioning (longer-term actions aiming at re-establishing the strategic 
direction, vision and overall purpose of the organizations).  
Furthermore, to validate these dimensions and elements, official planning and strategic documents 
were analysed and a focus group to pilot and contextualize the interview’s structure was conducted. 
The focus group involved elven informed people from the Ministry of Health and the National 
Health Agency, which discussed the eight dimensions and relative items describing the nature and 
value of financial recovery plans. Discussion on the item list continued until consensus was formed. 
At the end twenty dimensions were identified and included in the semi-structured interview. 
Overall, this research methodology is subjective in nature, where findings are richly descriptive and 
presented as themes/categories but they carry low level of generalizability. Indeed, social 
philosophers in early 1900s argue that interpretative understanding is based on arbitrary ideal types, 
which is based on previous knowledge and personal experience (see Alfred Schutz Common-Sense 
Constructs of the Reality). 
The second and third Essay follow the quantitative research tradition, where knowledge proceed 
through a process of hypothesising fundamentals law and then testing them empirically using 
measured variables (Singleton and Straits, 2005). The general positivistic approach is based on 
hypothesis testing to “uncover relationships among variables, in contrast to interpretative research 
where it is applied to understand important distinctions and patterns in meanings” (Gephart, 1999: 
15), thus, showing a preference for measurement oriented methods rather than meaning oriented 
methods. Moreover, positivist emphases the use of statistical criteria and concept of reliability and 
validity to evaluate the quality of quantitative findings (Shadish et al., 2002), in contrast to 
“trustworthiness criteria” and “authenticity criteria” (Gephart, 1999) employed by interpretativist. 
In light of the positivistic approach, the second essay presents the results of a European-wide survey 
lunched in spring 2012 and developed as part of the EU Seventh Framework programme research 
project Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the future (COCOPS, see 
www.cocops.eu). The survey addresses top public healthcare executive and aims – among other 
objectives – at gathering their impressions about government health policy responses to cope with 
decreasing levels of available resources induced by the economic, financial and fiscal crisis. The 
survey design process relies on the findings from a literature review on categories of approaches to 
cutback management elaborated in the public administration literature (Levine 1978; Pollitt 2010, 
Ringa et al., 2013). Specifically, one question directly probe for managers’ perception about the 
extent of use of one of the three basic cutback tactics (i.e., cut-across-the-board, targeted cuts, and 
productivity or efficiency gains) aimed at realizing savings in the healthcare sector (Pollitt, 2010) 
and additionally the survey investigates the perception of use of a rich set of cutback tools.  
In this case, primary data are generated by administering individual questionnaire to informed 
respondents across ten European countries13 with the aim of to generating a cross-national database 
upon which analyzes policy and managerial trends14. This study is designed as comparative study 
and aims at eliciting equivalent cross-national measurements answering to the need for more 
quantitative and rigorous comparative research, going beyond single-country and single-
13 The countries included are: Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Spain, The Netherlands and the UK. 
14 The survey design follows the standards included in the Guidelines for Best Practice in Cross-Cultural Surveys, Institute for Social 
Research, University of Michigan (2010).   
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organization approaches (see Derlien, 1992; Fitzpatrick et al., 2011; Pollitt 2011; Raadschelders and 
Lee, 2011). However, this type of studies face problems when trying to ensure consistency of 
methods and, therefore, its measures across its member nations (Jowell, 1998)15.  
Specifically, limitation in survey reliability across countries is the main concern when number of 
countries is high and homogeneity is low (i.e., thought processes, institutional frameworks, 
underlying values, and language have high variability) (Jowell, 1998). To overcome this threats, 
one single survey was rigorously and consistently (i.e., following an agreed timeframe) 
administered by country teams involved. Moreover, questions were carefully translate and back-
translated to ensure equivalent meanings across countries so to assign variation in the data to 
differences in the distribution of answers rather than to interpretation of questions. Also a 
conventional pretesting (i.e., a small sample of respondents from the target population is sampled 
and the survey is administered to them just as intended in the actual study) was included to best 
identify respondent-task difficulties in each country. In addition, concern over accuracy and honesty 
of responses is another threats to consider. To mitigate the problem anonymous online 
questionnaires were sent. The use of an online survey platform (Unipark) was chosen also because 
it allows higher inclusion and higher response rate, while being a potential cost saving research 
strategy.  
Despite some possible drawbacks in the design and significance of the data, survey methodology 
displays significant advantages. For example, it is claimed that the it provides higher level of 
generalizabity of results, since survey allows a wide and inclusive coverage meaning that it is more 
likely, compared to some other approaches, to get data based in a representative sample 
(Denscombe, 2007). For example, compared to qualitative studies, the size and composition of the 
sample in cross-national survey is known from the outset, and shape the overall design of the study, 
whereas interpretative research tends to adopt an approach to sampling which is based on sequential 
discovery of instances to be studied and which emphasizes the inclusion of “special instances” more 
than is generally the case with quantitative research (Denscombe, 2007). 
For this study a full census of top-level public healthcare decision makers and civil servants were 
surveyed in ten European countries, including both Bismark and Beveridge systems. Survey 
invitations were sent to the top three hierarchical levels of public sector executive working in the 
Ministry of Health, state and regional level executives, including the general directors, 
administrative directors and health directors of all public health organizations across the ten 
countries16. More than 2,000 names were included in the survey, which counts the entire population 
of interest for the survey, so no random sampling strategy was applied. In order to prompt contacted 
persons to take part to the research project and fill out the questionnaire, a personalized email 
message (in which people were addressed by name and in which the purpose of the survey and the 
significance of their active involvement was illustrated) was enclosed in the email. Moreover, 
15 It is often said that complete evaluation of reform in multiple context are difficult to perform because available evidence might be 
more extensive in some countries than others or materials available is highly normative or politicized, specific or abstract, concrete or 
theoretical and making meaningful comparative assessment results complex or impossible (Politt and Bouckaert, 1999). Moreover, 
few research initiatives have explored in depth the transformation of public administrations as triggered by NPM reform discourses in 
a systematic comparative form (Van de Walle and Hammerschmid, 2011). 
16 From a theoretical perspective the survey follows pioneering elite studies such as those of Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (see 
Putnam 1976, Aberbach et al., 1981, and Aberbach and Rockman, 2006), which lay the foundation for many other both national and 
cross-national executive surveys (e.g. Mayntz and Derlien, 1988; Christensen and Laegreid, 2007; Bertelli et al., 2007; Tronda,l 
2010; Bauer et al., 2009; COBRA survey; UDITE survey). 
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before the survey launch – in order to more effectively communication to potential respondents in 
the healthcare sector and boost the response rate –pre-testing and some national call about the 
project were made (Denscombe, 2007). Total valid answers from 760 respondents across ten 
countries (30.68% response rate) were received and 624 answers were used to run the multinomial 
regression analysis (Table 1 from Essay 2 gives full details about sample composition).  
In addition, for the purpose of the empirical analysis, individual-level information are 
complemented with country-level measures gathered from secondary data. Specifically, the essay, 
empirically identifies the influence of top managers demographic characteristics on patterns 
towards government cutback management decisions and examines whether those views relate to the 
basic traits of country healthcare system (i.e., Bismark or Beveridge) and public healthcare resource 
availability during the period in which the crisis manifested itself. 
We use multinomial logistic regression method to predict the probabilities of three uncorrelated 
categorical outcomes or alternatives: productivity savings (1); efficiency savings (2); and targeted 
cuts (3), given a set of independent variables. This technique is particularly useful since it allows for 
a simultaneous examination of multiple independent variables such as the effect of country-level 
and individual-level variables on the dependent variable (assuming statistical independence of 
explanatory variables) by fitting maximum likelihood estimation (Long and Freese, 2006). In the 
analysis, to ease the interpretation of regression coefficient, the estimates are transformed to 
relative-risk ratios corresponding to the exponential value of the multinomial logit coefficient. By 
doing this, we obtain the relative-risk ration for a unit change in the predictor variable, where risk is 
measured as the risk of the outcome relative to the base outcome. Thus, the relative risk ratio of 
outcome m relative to the referent group is expected to change by a factor of the respective 
parameter estimate given the variables in the model are held constant. 
Moving to a fully explanatory empirical study, the third essay investigates the cost-containment 
effect of public and private outsourcing decisions in the provision of hospital inpatient service in the 
Italian context using region-year panel data. Specifically, three hypotheses were tested using a 
fixed-effects linear panel regression analysis aiming at identifying the impact of public and private 
outsourcing after excluding regional time-invariant factors (e.g., institutional healthcare models, 
which are the same for a given cross-sectional unit through time but vary across cross-sectional 
units). Hypotheses are developed on the base of contracting-out theory that builds on Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1973, 1979) and Agency Theory (Warner and Hafetz, 2008) 
contextualized to non-market setting (Pollitt, Thiel, and Homburg 2007). 
In this case evidence of the construct of interest (impact of outsourcing decision on public 
healthcare expenditure) is tested using already available measure. Precisely, secondary data on 
regional per-capita public expenditure on health were collected through national health databases 
publically available. Proxy for public and private outsourcing constructs, measured as the 
proportion of regional hospital beds managed by public and private independent hospitals, 
respectively, were gather using national and regional health databases. National database were 
primarily used to check regional overall measure and to reconcile the regional data on number of 
providers across time. The sample includes the entire universe of public and accredited Italian 
healthcare providers from 1997 to 2010 and the mean-year regional value are used to test 
hypothesis. Thus, the unit of analysis is represented by the 21 Italian regional healthcare systems 
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totaling 294 region-time observations.  
The use of longitudinal data has multiple advantages (Hsiao and Yanan, 2006) such as improving 
the efficiency of empirical models because of the large number of data points that increase the 
degree of freedom, limit collinearity among explanatory variables and reduce measurement errors. 
Moreover, by using information on both the intertemporal dynamics and the individual of the 
entities being investigates, one is able to control for the effects of missing or unobservable 
variables, thus provide more accurate predictions for the phenomenon. However, some drawbacks 
in the application of panel data regression exist. Specifically, in the study parameter heterogeneity 
issue could affect model results. Indeed, the concept of public outsourcing used is not homogeneous 
across regional contexts, since public outsourcing differs considerably in the degree of separation 
(institutional and financial) between hospitals directly managed by local health authorities and 
public hospital enterprises (AOs). Therefore, the measure is a potentially heterogeneous proxy of 
public outsourcing and should be treated with care when discussing normative implications.  
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Essay 1 - The challenge and the future of health care turnaround plans: evidence from the 
Italian experience 
 
A draft of the essay was presented at the 5th Annual European Public Health Conference, 8-10 
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Abstract: Over the last two decades, health policy and governance in Italy have undergone 
decentralisation at the regional level. The central government was expected to play a guiding role in 
defining minimum care standards and controlling health expenditures at the regional level in order 
to keep the entire Italian National Health System (INHS) on track. Although health performance 
trends have been consistent across regions, public health expenditures have been variable and 
contributed to a cumulative deficit of 38 billion Euros from 2001 to 2010. To address the deficit, the 
government called for a resolution introducing a partial bail-out plan and later institutionalised a 
process to facilitate a turnaround. The upturn started with the development of a formal regional 
turnaround plan that proposed strategic actions to address the structural determinants of costs. The 
effectiveness of this tool was widely questioned, and many critics suggested that it was focused 
more on methods to address short-term issues than on the long-term strategic reconfiguration that is 
required for regional health systems to ultimately address the structural causes of deficits. We 
propose an interpretative framework to understand the advantages and disadvantages of turnaround 
plans, and we apply the findings to the development of policy recommendations for the structure, 
methods, processes and contexts of the implementation of this tool.  
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1. From centralisation to devolution: 20 years of positives and negatives in the change of the 
governance of the Italian NHS 
 
Over the last two decades, the centralised system of health policy in Italy has transitioned to a 
system characterised by the devolution of control to the regional level. The Reform Law of the early 
1990s, which introduced decentralisation17 in the Italian National Health Service (INHS)18, 
stemmed from the common perception that political, fiscal and organisational devolution would 
make regions more responsible for funding, organising and delivering health services in their own 
territories. The wide and comprehensive reform process transformed the role of central and regional 
governments and coincided with the international New Public Management (NPM) movement [4] 
by introducing managerialism, regionalisation and quasi-market mechanisms [5]. To ensure 
compatibility and coherence within the overall health care system, the Reform Law stipulated that 
the central government maintains a guiding role in defining and controlling both the achievement of 
fundamental health care objectives19 and the financial sustainability of health care expenditures at 
the regional level [6][7][8]. In contrast, regions are expected to develop their own regional health 
plans, set priorities, create strategies to meet local health care needs and expectations, negotiate 
funding levels with the central government and allocate the budget within their systems. As a result, 
since 2001, the regions have become more fiscally autonomous20 and more financially 
responsible21, and they have acquired more managerial discretion over the organisation of health 
care services. As a consequence, the INHS is now composed of twenty-one local health systems, 
one for each different Italian region. Emilia and Lombardy are often referred to as polar examples 
of these different systems [10]. The aims of the devolution reform have been two-fold: to increase 
microeconomic efficiency [11] and to increase the financial responsibility of the regions, thereby 
17 The concept of decentralisation is rather ambiguous. In this study, we refer to the classic description presented by 
Sherwood (1969) [1] and Rondinelli (1981) [2], which proposes four types of decentralisation: deconcentration, 
delegation, devolution and privatisation. In this work, we consider the form of decentralisation that corresponds to 
devolution, as this form represents the case of the INHS, where decisional power is transferred to geographic units of 
local government that lie outside the formal command structure of the central government [3]. 
18 Legislative Decrees 502/1992 and 517/1993 involve the initiation of the process of devolving health care powers to 
the regions and a parallel delegation of managerial autonomy to hospitals and local health authorities. The subsequent 
Constitutional Law N.3, 18 October 2001, modifies the second part of the Italian Constitution (Title V) by 
institutionalising the devolution process and providing regions with more power. 
19 Art. 117 of the Constitution –“Determination of the essential levels of services in regards to civil and social rights to 
be guaranteed in the whole country pertain to the national Parliament and central Government”. The Minister of Health 
maintains the exclusive power of setting the Essential Level of Care, which identify the broad categories of health 
services (e.g., outpatient, inpatient, rehabilitation) that must be delivered within the INHS funding. Each region has the 
power to enhance the portfolio of health services delivered in addition to those required by the Essential Levels of Care 
by taking on the relevant burden with their own resources. This agreement was implemented by Legislative Decree N. 
347, 18 September 2001, and later converted into law N. 405, 16 November 2001.  This latter piece of legislation 
addresses “Urgent action for health care expenditure”. 
20 Decree Law 56/2000. Fiscal federalism abolished the national health fund and introduced taxation yield that was 
directly attributed to the regions. The change was expected to come about gradually, bearing in mind historical health 
care spending during the first three-year period. Moreover, the central government set up a national equalisation fund 
financed by VAT revenue sharing to increase resources to meet the expenditure standards of the regions and to 
guarantee the provision of the Essential Level of Care across the entire country. 
21 Regions are accountable for covering any future deficit with their own resources. These resources include regional 
taxes (a business tax IRAP, a surtax on the national personal income tax IRPEF and a vehicle tax) and co-payments for 
services directly paid by service users to regional governments [9]. These tax rates are determined nationally, but 
regions have some flexibility to increase or decrease the level according to national thresholds.  
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stopping the accusations of blame between the regions and the central government regarding 
resource allocation [7]. 
During the implementation of the interventions, similar trends in health outcomes were 
recorded across the regions, although southern regions  showed lower efficiency levels in 
production costs, lower accessibility (longer waiting list and a limited range of specialized services 
and technologies compared to northern regions) and lower appropriateness of care (incorrect use of 
procedures, drugs, therapies and care settings) [12] [13] [14]. However, public health expenditures 
were highly variable across the regions and generated over 38 billion Euros of cumulative deficit 
between 2001 and 2010, which is equivalent to one-third of national health care expenditures in 
201022. Among the twenty-one regions, Sicily, Campania and Lazio accounted for the highest 
cumulative deficits (26,274 million Euros), and seven other regions23 have exceeded the deficit 
thresholds established for them by the central government24  
----------- 
(Tables and Figures  
Table 3) 
----------- 
 
The regional discrepancies presented in Tables and Figures  
Table 3 highlight the policy issues faced by the Italian NHS regarding the financial viability of 
regional health systems. Indeed, during the implementation phase, some of the regions that already 
enjoyed substantial autonomy expressed worry that devolution would create financial problems due 
to the lack of fiscal autonomy and managerial competence in some southern regions [7]. 
Deficit management should be carried out individually by regions using resources derived from 
introducing regional prescription charges, generating savings on the acquisition of goods and 
services, limiting the expenditures on health care providers, reclassifying drugs that are charged to 
the INHS, imposing mark-ups to the regional tax rates and/or selling properties. However, during 
the first years of devolution (2001-2005), the central government continued a partial bail-out to 
finance the past health deficit of the regions25 [10]. Confronting the risk of an escalating deficit, the 
Italian government called for a resolution in late 2005 and early 2006 that would institutionalise a 
new process for recovery to reduce the financial instability of the regional health care systems26 [5]. 
We should acknowledge that financial imbalance among health organizations is a serious worry that 
other European health systems have experienced in the past decade. For example, the English NHS 
faced an overall net deficit of almost £1 billion during 2004-2006 financial years [16] and also in 
22 Relazione Generale della Situazione Economica del Paese –RGSEP 2010, Ministry of Health and Finance. 
23 Piedmont, Liguria, Abruzzo, Molise, Apulia, Calabria and Sardinia. 
24 The deficit threshold is calculated using the regional annual healthcare deficit and the pre-existing deficit that regions 
are not able to manage with their own resources.  
25 On October 5th, 2006, the Italian government and the regional governments signed a “pact” (“Patto per la Salute”), 
the main points of which have since been enforced by the Finance Stability Law  L. 296, 27 December 2006. The INHS 
funding for the period 2007–2009 was slightly increased, and extra funds were allocated to cover deficits incurred in 
2006. A “special fund” was created for those regions with high deficits (greater than 7% of the funding), which were 
contingent on each region signing specific agreements with both the MoH and MoEF based on a Budgetary Balance 
Plan. These plans aimed to contain health expenditures and balance the health accounts by 2010 (an extra 3,000 million 
euro was also allocated to cover deficits for the years 2001–2005) [15]. 
26 Financial Stability Law L. 311, 30 December 2004. 
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this case the government took a series of actions centrally coordinated by the Performance 
Directorate in order to restore the situation27 [17].  
 
2. The struggle for regional turnarounds: decoupling the recovery plan process 
Between 2001 and 2010, ten Italian regions accumulated significant deficits and were expected to 
design and pursue a turnaround strategy.  
The turnaround process was to begin with the development of a formal regional recovery plan 
(RRP) that would propose strategic actions addressing the structural determinants of the 
organisational failures and costs of the region [18] [19] [20]28. In general, recovery plans are 
instruments designed to increase efficiency and reduce deficit problems in the future [10].   
RRPs were expected to contribute to the turnaround process by functioning as triggers for 
change. The plans provided the following: the recognition and explicit acknowledgment of the 
extent and serious nature of the regional financial and organisational issues as well as retrenchment 
and stabilisation through the implementation of short-term actions and long-term system 
reconfiguration (e.g., establishing a new vision, reorganising and developing capacity). 
In many Italian regions, the turnaround process was slow and inconsistent because coordination 
and control between the players involved in the process was tenuous and unsteady. A plurality of 
actors weakly engaged in the process was called upon to take action and facilitate the recovery 
strategy of failing regional health systems (Table 1).  
Regional health departments were asked to develop RRPs, which were subject to approval by 
the national Ministry of Health (MoH) and Ministry of Economy and Finance (MoEF). If the 
departments failed to produce a viable RRP, the regions were commissioned by the central 
government. Audit firms were asked to recognise and explicitly assess the public debt positions of 
each failing regional health system, thus activating capacity building initiatives to increase the 
27 The English NHS have registered almost £1 billion overspending mainly due to over performance caused by a 
growing perception that sound financial management was less important than delivery. In light of this growing deficit 
the government combined operational performance and financial management responsibilities within the Department of 
Health (DoH) to ensure that there could be no trade-off between these two aspects. DoH increased also the frequency 
and depth of the direct monitoring of deficit organizations and facilitated the involvement of private sector turnaround 
specialists in the NHS. English NHS between 2005 and 2007 registered change to the financial regime included the 
introduction of new arrangements for cash loans; the end of the resource accounting and budgeting regime for NHS 
trusts; and the introduction of a new capital regime for NHS trusts from 2007/08. Also change to the structure of the 
NHS. Implementation of the Department of Health’s Commissioning a Patient-led NHS initiative, led to the number of 
SHAs reducing from 28 to 10 and the number of PCTs reducing from 303 to 152. In addition the number of ambulance 
trusts was reduced from 29 to 12.  
28An expected turnaround consists of a “collection of concerted or coordinated activities which may include the 
replacement of key individuals in the organization’s management and leadership, immediate attention to major 
operational problems seeking short-term solutions, and the longer term, but often radical, redesign or re-profiling of the 
organization and its business” ([19], pg. 201). RRPs should contain a diagnosis of heterogeneous cause-effect 
relationships between endogenous and exogenous determinants that cause performance decline [21] asset 
reorganization; human resource management and ICT enhancement; long-term vision development (e.g., repositioning 
health organisations; defining sustainable productive capacity; and increasing health service efficiency). 
The private sector evidence suggests that recovery from failure is associated with strategies of (i) replacement – 
involving the removal of key members of the leadership and management of the organization; (ii) retrenchment – short-
term actions taken to stabilize the organisation, to stem its losses and to deal with the immediate problems which have 
precipitated its crisis; and (iii) repositioning or renewal involving longer-term actions aimed at re-establishing the 
strategic direction, vision and overall purpose of the organization and placing it on a longer-term pathway to successful 
performance [19]. 
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reliability of decentralised systems. Furthermore, the best-performing health regional systems were 
selected to support and advise troubled regions.  
 
-------------- 
(Table 1) 
-------------- 
Although the central government made a concerted effort (backed by the National Health Agency  -
AGENAS) to establish a system of supervision and monitoring to direct regions during the 
turnaround phase, the pattern of development for recovery strategies appears rather unsystematic, 
irregular and lacking in consensus-building initiatives [8].  
Enabling the turnaround process in highly institutionalised contexts (i.e., those inclined to 
tolerate failure) is rather difficult [21]. The central government failed to recognise the specific 
situations and circumstances of organisational failure within different regions and instead treated 
regions as homogeneous “black boxes”. Indeed each region on the base of central Ministries 
indications asked for similar RRPs because of required urgent action not counting their real 
feasibility. In the end, recovery strategy proved to be unmanageable for some regions [19] [22] [23]. 
This mishandling contributed to significant doubts regarding the effectiveness of recovery plans, 
which were perceived by most to be focused more on the means to address short-term issues than 
on the long-term strategic reconfigurations required for regional health systems to solve the 
structural causes of the deficits. Finally, the RRPs seemed to contain primarily “cosmetic” 
interventions driven by a lack of recognition of regional differences and compliance with central 
government expectations. This is also because ex ante control mechanisms on law compliance by 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance were not jointly accompanied by substantial and depth direct 
monitoring of deficit organizations by the Ministry of Health. 
 
3. Recovery vs. turnaround: analysis and findings from an investigation of the top three 
financially distressed regions 
Given the general perception of the failure of RRPs to meet their intended purpose, we performed a 
qualitative analysis to empirically investigate the evidence supporting this perception [24] among 
the three regional health systems that over time accounted for the highest cumulative deficit: Sicily, 
Campania and Lazio (cfr. pg.2). We applied a range of field methods aiming at triangulating data, in 
order to avoid potential bias from a single data source [25][26][27]. Longitudinal qualitative data 
were collected over a period of eighteen months (April 2009 – June 2010). The primary method of 
data collection involved semi-structured interviews with the following key informants: (i) the head 
of the Ministry of Health recovery planning, evaluation and control unit (n=1); (ii) the department 
heads and staff members from the three regional health departments (n=4); (iii) external consultants 
from the National Health Agency and the Auditing Firm selected by government (n=8); medical 
directors from local health authorities and hospitals located in the three regional settings who 
actively participated to the turnaround meetings at regional and national level (n=12 equally 
distributed for each case-study). These qualitative interviews, which typically lasted on average 45 
minutes, focused on understanding the perceptions of key informants about RRPs effectiveness. In 
order to assess the potential effectiveness of RRPs and turnaround strategies and processes for the 
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interviews we developed a list of dimensions and elements exploring RRPs’ content, process 
development and implementation (Table 3). These selected items have been drawn from the design 
properties of strategic plans literature [27] since healthcare recovery plans resemble a model of 
failure and turnaround emerged from for-profit organizations [19]. Furthermore, to validate these 
dimensions and elements we analysed the official planning and strategic documents of each of the 
three case-study (recovery plan documents, regional health plans and the executive orders by 
National Government commissioners) and we conducted a focus group at the end of one of the  
public meeting organized by the Ministry of Health and the National Health Agency about the 
general aim and framework of RRPs (n=2) we participated29. This last exercise also facilitated to 
contextualize and form the base for the interviews. 
During the semi-structured interviews, interviewees were asked to assign values from one 
(negative) to five (positive) in a Likert scale (1- inadequate or undefined; 2- insufficient; 3- 
sufficient; 4- satisfactory; 5- optimum) to the list of items. Interviews were audio-recorded and later 
transferred to paper. In few circumstances in which an interviewee indicated discomfort with being 
recorded, we took notes during the interview and wrote up a summary of the interview after the 
session. These summaries were shown to the interviewees, who evaluated their accuracy. 
Additionally, we tried to engage in informal conversations to interpret and understand how the key 
informants perceived RRPs and turnaround process, especially in regard to social interaction with 
other actors.  
  
------------- 
(Table 2) 
------------- 
The findings from the analysis of the three regional case-studies highlighted many flaws in the 
depth, robustness and comprehensiveness of the RRPs as well as in the overall credibility of the 
financial sustainability strategies (Lazio and Campania on average were valued less than 2 or 
insufficient while Sicily got closer to a sufficient level of efficacy). In the end, the prevailing 
perceptions about the limited efficacy of the RRPs were confirmed. One salient finding was the 
correlation between a low-quality RRP and a failure to replace regional government structures; 
interviewees indicated that financially distressed regions had both the largest and weakest 
management staffs (in terms of skills and competences) among all Italian regions. Regional officials 
were not competent to manage the new task of planning short-term, rapid improvement efforts 
while also developing long-term turnaround strategies.  
Unfortunately, regions were largely limited in their capacity to improve their technostructure 
because the turnover of administrative personnel was blocked by the central government as a 
punitive action, and strict cost limitations were enforced on management education and training, 
both of which were necessary to develop the current staff. Regions were allowed to externally 
recruit top managers, but they continue to struggle with the inadequacy of their key middle 
29 The focus group involved 11 informed people representing the three regional context analysed (3 regional officials, 3 
managers of health organizations, 2 officials of the National Health Agency and 3 researchers studying 
management from local universities) and lasted four hours. The members of the focus group had received  the list of 
items in advance and the focus group exercise aimed at discussing and validating such list. The evaluation showed a 90 
percent of congruence on the items selected. Incongruence was discussed and reconciled with the recovery plan 
documents. 
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management personnel. Furthermore, limitations on management training have spurred the creation 
of regional in-house training agencies, similar to “royal suppliers” for the Region [28], with the 
inherent risk that these agencies (sometime represented by local universities) do not have a critical 
and open perspective on the regional system because they themselves depend on it. These agencies 
risk quickly becoming servants, bowing to the wills of the regional administration [8]. 
 
4. Implications for policy-makers and managers 
Several implications for policy makers and managers working in the INHS were developed from the 
analysis of the effectiveness of recovery plans. Overall, some interesting insights emerged from the 
mechanisms through which decentralised health care systems can be better managed and recovery 
plans made more effective. Though, before we present the implications, we need to point out the 
nature of the contexts. We find in all cases two main features which characterized pluralistic 
contexts: multiple goals and diffuse power [29]. Clearly, all organizations are pluralistic, but public 
healthcare system and organizations particularly have a higher pluralistic level. Pluralism and 
diffuse power are the strongest  barriers to make successfully the turnaround [30]. In this 
perspective, some implications hereafter discussed do not consider context-related issues, but most 
of them refer to technical aspects that need to be taken in account to increase the chances that the 
expected changes included in the  RRP take place even in pluralistic environments as the ones that 
characterize the INHS, Italian Regions, LHAs and hospitals.  
1. The creation of a strong and reliable informational base (refers to D2, D3.3, D5 and D7 in 
Table 3). Turnaround plans should contain detailed qualitative and quantitative information 
that is directly available from the organisation or aggregated from external sources. All 
sources of information should reflect high-quality information, which is defined as 
consistent, significant and complete.  
2. Punctual definitions of assumptions and evidence (refers to D3.1 in Table 3). To avoid 
arbitrariness and/or errors in decisions that could subsequently invalidate the assumptions 
used as the foundation for the turnaround plans, organisations should invest in continuum 
planning to explicate their rules and hypotheses. Expert advice is welcomed during this 
phase. 
3. Detailed strategic analysis at the regional and local level (refers to D3.2 in Table 3). The 
turnaround process cannot be conducted as a standardised and predefined action; rather, it is 
necessary to customise each process according to the specific context and needs. Is 
fundamental to have trustworthy decision-makers with well-established strategic 
competencies that are able to uniformly steer local health systems towards turnaround 
actions. 
4. Definition of scenarios (refers to D3.4 and D4.1 in Table 3). Recovery plans should contain 
dynamic scenarios30 rather than merely desired output. The scenarios should represent a 
variety of possible situations that could act as the grounds for discussion between 
practitioners and other relevant stakeholders, thereby becoming learning tools. 
5. Clear indication of the responsibility structure (refers to D4.3 in Table 3). Assumption 
definition, strategic analysis and scenario design are fundamental steps towards an effective 
30 Three types of evolutionary scenarios are generally considered: (i) base case; (ii) conservative or worst case and (iii) 
best case.  
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turnaround process definition, but actions should follow. Turnaround plans should identify 
and assign coherent objectives to autonomous subjects who are responsible for executing a 
specific task and are evaluated through performance measurement systems. 
6. Definition of action steps and an established timeframe (refers to D1.3 and D4.2 in Table 3). 
A turnaround strategy consists of a process of change, and the plan should contain clear, 
incremental action steps described in an iterative manner. Action steps should favour system 
efficiency and responsiveness and enable readjustment and realignment. In addition, a 
realistic timeframe for each step should be defined.  
7. Inclusion of stakeholders (refers to D6.5 and D8 in Table 3). The turnaround process should 
occur in a pluralistic context, so that the inclusion of more actors in the definition of the 
actions is binding. However, it is necessary to clarify the scope and roles of each actor and 
to assign clear, coordinating responsibilities. Moreover, the inclusion of the community 
should be greater and citizens should be involved in the turnaround definition and 
implementation process. 
8. Development of knowledge transfer, culture and tools (refers to D4.4 in Table 3). Health 
care organisations are currently more complex and interdependent than ever before, 
requiring the enhancement of change management and institutional relations capabilities at 
every level. During the turnaround process, knowledge transfer should be considered a key 
aspect to support, spur and develop learning capacity inside the organisation through the use 
of learning tools, incentives and communication strategies; moreover, knowledge transfer 
should be facilitated by external influences31. Knowledge transfer could fill the gap of 
limited management capabilities to deal with the challenges of  difficult financial position. 
9. The level of alignment and degree of discretion between decision makers (refers to D6.1- 
D6.4 in Table 3). A turnaround plan should be developed jointly by central government and 
managers of local health organisations. Though turnaround plans can be very detailed, some 
critical choices regarding the contents of health care delivered cannot be limited to the 
central level. For instance, the ethical use of medical devices, drugs and examinations can be 
shaped by guidelines and system initiatives, but daily choices still remain with doctors. In 
turn, the discretionary zone is still quite significant. Managers must engage and challenge 
doctors and other professionals on these choices and also advise policy-makers on the focus 
that turnaround plans should take to tackle such issues. Similarly, managers should also 
advise the creators of recovery plans to avoid the adoption of choices that ultimately limit 
access to care through horizontal spending cuts that do not take into account the specific 
needs of patients and certain minority groups.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The nine policy recommendations detailed above address the structure, content, process and context 
of implementation efforts for effective turnaround strategy. These findings can inform the ongoing 
international debate on the policies, tools and governance systems (e.g., the mechanism of 
turnaround plans) that central governments should adopt to lead and control heterogeneous, 
complex, decentralised heath systems, especially during periods of major economic downturn and 
crisis. 
31 Learning organisation [31] [32]. 
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Tables and Figures  
Table 3 Deficit spending by region (2010) 
 
Source: Adapted from Relazione Generale della Situazione Economica del Paese –RGSEP 2010, Minister of Health and 
Finance. 
Note: Grey shaded values highlight the three regions analyzed. 
 
 
Table 2 Actors involved in the turnaround strategy and their roles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region Cumulative Deficit 
2001-2010 (ml €)
Deficit 2010 (ml €) Per capita Deficit 
2010 (€)
Contribution to the 
INHS Deficit 2010 (% )
Abruzzo 1,301 19 14 1%
Apulia 1,911 335 82 14%
Calabria 1,009 -18 -9 -1%
Campania 8,521 496 85 21%
Lazio 13,388 1,044 184 45%
Liguria 1,299 89 55 4%
Molise 625 53 167 2%
Piedmont 966 -9 -2 0%
Sardinia 1,732 229 137 10%
Sicily 4,365 62 12 3%
Total Deficit of Regions with 
recovery plan 35,118 2,300 69 99%
Total Deficit of Regions 
without recovery plan 2,982 26 1 1%
Total Deficit INHS 38,100 2,326 38 100%
Formal role Active role
Regional Health Departments and Regional 
Health Authorities
Development of recovery plan document Adaption of recovery plan document from central government (MoH and MoEF) 
proposed scheme
Ministry of Health (MoH) and Ministry of 
Finance (MoF)
Formal approval of regional recovery plans; coaching and 
monitoring activities 
Audit and control
Auditing firms
Debt position recognition; introduction and integration of 
regional budgets and accounting proceeding of health units
Capacity building; enhancement of action credibility and consequent regional decision 
makers deresponsabilization
Best performing health regional systems Consulting and supporting function Creation of partnerships 
National Health Agency  (AGENAS) Incentive and collaborative action
Development of procedures and models to overcome regional difficulties; selection of 
experts to plan and implement turnaround strategies in specific areas; introduction of 
auditing and managerial tools; communication plan strategy support 
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Table 3 Assessment of the effectiveness of recovery plans developed by the Campania, Lazio 
and Sicily regions, mean values. 
 
Dimension Element discussed  
Likert Scale value by Region 
Campania  Lazio Sicily 
D1 Completeness and coherence  
1. Overall detail of the main sections of the 
recovery plan  4 3 5 
2. Different sections of the recovery plan clearly 
connected by causal links 3 2 4 
3. Technical compatibility of proposed actions 
with timeframe and available resources 2 1 2 
D2 Information range and depth Variety and detail of information 2 2 3 
D3 Data reliability 
1. Veridicity of initial assumptions and of 
forecasts 2 2 2 
2. Compatibility of the recovery plan with local 
and regional context dynamics 3 2 3 
3. Comparability with recent results or 
availability of strong motivations to justify 
relevant gap 
2 3 3 
4. Clarity of forecasting data  2 1 2 
D4 Feasibility 
1. Capacity of the recovery plan to guide action 
and act as foundation for future controls 2 2 4 
2. Availability and degree of detail of the action 
plan 1 2 4 
3. Capacity to define roles and responsibilities at 
local and regional level 1 1 3 
4. Advance of management culture and tools  2 2 3 
D5 Financial sustainability Ability to indicate cost-containment measures while promoting higher quality of health services  1 2 3 
D6 Cooperation features 
1. Governance quality 1 1 4 
2. Management capacity and determination  1 1 2 
3. HH.RR. attitude and commitment 1 1 1 
4. Working climate 1 1 1 
5. Stakeholders' involvement: patients' 
associations and suppliers 1 1 1 
D7 Intrinsic risks explanation Detailed definition of risks 1 1 1 
D8 Communication to citizens   1 1 1 
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Essay 2 - The fiscal crisis in the health sector: patterns of cutback management across Europe 
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Abstract: 
Purpose: The article investigates trends in health sector cutback management strategies occurred 
during the ongoing financial and fiscal crisis across Europe. Setting: a European-wide survey to top 
public healthcare managers was conducted in ten countries to understand their perception about 
public sector policy reactions to the financial and economic crisis. Answers from 760 respondents 
from the healthcare sector (30.7% response rate) were analysed. Method: A multinomial logistic 
regression was used to assess the characteristics of respondents, country institutional healthcare 
models and the trend in public health resource availability during the crisis to the decision to 
introduce general unselected cuts, targeted cuts or efficiency savings measures. Also data about 
tools and measures used to cope with the crisis are analysed. Results: differentiated responses to the 
fiscal crisis that buffeted public finances have been reported both across countries and within 
countries. Organizational position of respondents is significant in predicting the probability of 
perceiving approach to savings, also Beveridge-like countries favour the introduction of targeted or 
priority cuts and, at increasing level of available resources countries strive to maintain sustainability 
by employing efficiency savings strategies. Finally, countries display a preference for adjusting 
personnel policies to achieve cost-containment rather than affecting scope of service provided. 
Conclusion: the article provides thus-far unavailable evidence about the approaches adopted by 
European countries to cope with the effects of the fiscal crisis; it suggests that health sectors are 
undergoing important organizational changes. 
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1. Introduction 
The paper provides empirical evidence from ten countries in Europe about the pro-cyclical 
approaches adopted by public managers to tackle the shrinkage of funds buffeting the health care 
sector, as a consequence of the ongoing financial, economic and fiscal crises [1,2]. Pro-cyclical 
approaches to the global financial crisis advocate reducing public spending and achieving savings in 
times of financial constraints, in contrast to counter-cyclical approaches that advocate public 
spending to boost the economy [3]. Reduction in spending on public healthcare service in order to 
curb public debt appears to be quite a popular policy among European governments since the 
outbreak of the crisis, though adopted at different speed and intensity [4-6].  
 
Since 2009, public health spending has slowed markedly or fallen in many European countries, after 
years of continuous growth. Data from a representative sample of European countries included in 
the empirical study, namely Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Spain, The 
Netherlands and the UK show that overall public health expenditure trend has experienced a 
positive growth from 2000 to 2009 with different magnitude across countries, followed by a 
persistent decline that started earlier in the eastern European countries (Hungary and Estonia) 
(Figure 1). Specifically, per capita government health spending over the period 2000-2009 is 
estimated to have grown on average, in real terms, by 3.9% annually. In stark contrast, over the 
subsequent three years (2009-12), average public health spending yearly increased by just 0.93% as 
an effect of the economic crisis that buffeted public finances (Figure 2). The extent of the slowdown 
in public health spending has varied considerably across Europe affecting mainly those in the 
easternmost part due to severe macroeconomic downturns [6,7]. Estonia, for example, recorded an 
annual average decrease in per capita public health spending by negative 0.4% between 2009 and 
2012, after a yearly growth rate of more than 5% between 2000 and 2009. Also the Netherlands, the 
UK, Spain and Italy have experienced significant reduction in public spending during “crises-time” 
compared to the average growth rate before “crises-time” (almost 5 point decrease in the 
Netherlands and the UK and about 3.5 in Spain and Italy).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 Per capita public health expenditure trend 2000-2012 (base year 2000). 
 
Source: [8,9] 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 Annual average growth rates (%) in per capita public health expenditure, real terms, 2000-2009 and 
2009- 2012. 
 
Source: [8,9] 
Note: Real growth rate are calculated using GDP deflator. 
Against the backdrop of a tough reduction in the annual average growth rate in per capita health 
expenditure, it is significant from both a social scientific and a policy standpoint to gain insights 
into the ways in which public managers coped with the challenges to the quality and universality of 
health services across Europe. Accordingly, this contribution provides timely and large-scale 
empirical evidence on the perceptions of executive public managers in the healthcare sector about 
the patterns of response adopted by their respective countries to manage cuts and the specific 
measures employed. More specifically, three basic approaches to cutback management have been 
identified [10]: proportional cuts across the border (i), the adoption of targeted cost containment 
policies (ii), or the search for productivity and efficiency gains (iii); moreover, a series of cost 
reducing measures that can be used often in combination as tools for effecting the chosen cutback 
management approach have been envisaged (e.g., personnel policies like staff layoffs or pay 
freezes, cutting existing programmes or postponing new programmes, etc.). The usage of these 
cutback management approaches and measures for cutting operational expenses across ten 
representative European countries is analysed by means of primary data gathered from a survey 
administered to top public healthcare executives. Using regression analysis, the paper empirically 
identifies the influence of top managers’ demographic and organizational characteristics, healthcare 
institutional arrangements and magnitude of public healthcare expenditure reduction on the patterns 
of cutback management deployed in response to the extant major fiscal crisis in Europe. The 
contribution also examines country preferences in the use of specific cost reducing measures and 
tools employed for coping with the reduction in public funding. 
Overall, the article contributes to informing the current debate on the strategic and managerial 
approaches adopted in public health service delivery to cope with the mounting fiscal crisis in 
Europe [5]. We first give an overview of the reference literature on cutback management 
approaches and the ways in which they combine [10], to then provide a description of the empirical 
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setting (sample and data collection) and present data from the ten European countries. Data are 
analysed by gauging both individual-level and country-level variables. Discussion and conclusion 
follow. 
2. Cutback management approaches: a framework of reference 
Detailed categories of approaches to cutback management in public administration have been 
elaborated in the literature, notably following up the seminal article by Levine [11], and interest in 
these approaches has mounted in the current debate about the post-2008 financial, economic and 
fiscal crises. Traditionally, the literature discusses specific features of public sector responses to 
recession or austerity times, such as cutback budgeting and termination of programmes, or 
leadership tactics for managing resources’ decline [12]. Interestingly, recent publications show a 
concern for the longer-term implications of the relationship between cuts and reforms, and discuss 
underlying issues in managing the new responsibilities of governments [13].  
As noticed by Peters et al. [2], crisis may not be “the most felicitous time to begin to think about 
restructuring government and creating new procedures. That type of restructuring within the public 
sector is itself disruptive, and attempting to implement institutional change in the midst of a crisis 
may appear to be a recipe for confusion and failure” [2:p.16]. However, crises may also be triggers 
of change. This article is concerned with the empirical questions of what governmental approaches 
have been selected to cope with decreasing levels of available resources and what differences can 
be detected across Europe.  
Among the cutback management strategies usually adopted by public organizations, Pollitt [10] 
identifies three basic stances or approaches [14,15]: cut-across-the-board, targeted cuts, and 
productivity or efficiency gains. Across-the-board cuts (or linear cuts) are interpreted as the 
“traditional” response and refers to cuts in equal amounts or percentages for all institutions, while 
targeted cuts imply that some institutions and sectors face a larger cut than the others. As suggested 
by Kickert [4], this distinction resembles the classical dichotomy between incremental decision 
making and rational-comprehensive decision-making. Finally, achieving productivity or efficiency 
gains requires deploying a consistent reform strategy, often including a mix of provisions, such as 
exploiting technological innovation, setting priorities in services provision and user needs, using 
non-service approaches, building new relationships and creating alliances, and others [12]. 
Specifically, the first, and in many respects the easiest one, lies in effecting proportional cuts 
across-the-board (also called “cheese-slicing” [10], “decrementalism” [16-18], and “equal misery” 
approach [19]), across all areas (i.e., decrementalism). Policies following this approach result in 
linear reductions of the funding of the health system across its compartments. Such approach may 
destabilize the health system if it erodes financial protection, equitable access to care and the quality 
of care provided, possibly increasing healthcare and other costs in the longer term. In addition to 
introducing the risk of long-term inefficiencies, cuts across-the-board are unlikely to address 
existing inefficiencies, potentially exacerbating the fiscal constraint [5].  
At the opposite side, Pollitt [10] places targeted cuts, that is, cuts driven by political, institutional, 
and organizational priorities adopted, e.g., to protect poorer people, to concentrate resources on the 
needy or to prevent adverse effects on employment [6]. The “targeted” or “selective” cuts approach 
has been conceived of as involving an array of possible tactics, ranging from “strategic 
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prioritization” to “ad hoc” or even “random” (or garbage can) cuts [18;11;20-22]. As a consequence 
some organisations and areas of public policy face a larger reduction in outlays than others. When 
proceeding with selective cuts based on strategic prioritizations, their assessment is crucial and 
conflicts may arise, since sectors, organizations or subunits within the same organizations face 
different levels of retrenchment; in the case of healthcare provision, cuts can directly affect patients 
by selectively redefining contribution schemes, benefits or limiting tax subsidies for out-of-pocket 
payments. For example, France selectively increased contributions for wealthier people (self-
employed people with very high incomes) while Denmark reduced tax subsidies that predominantly 
benefit wealthier households for out-of-pocket payments [6].  
In-between the two approaches, and in a certain sense at another level because this is potentially a 
“definitive” solution, the literature identifies a third approach that refers to cost containment 
measures based on productivity and efficiency gains. This response reflects the intention of 
avoiding the harms of expenditure cuts by reaping the benefits of increased productivity and 
efficiency. Efficiency gains imply achieving similar outcomes at lower costs (technical efficiency), 
or better outcomes at similar costs, including increasing the value of the output or the appropriate 
combination of health programmes to maximize the health of society (allocative efficiency) [5;23]. 
As already hinted to, this is seen as a potentially definitive solution, because efficiency gains may 
potentially shift the trade-off and avoid, partly or entirely, the pains of effecting cuts. For instance, 
some countries strengthened policies to improve prescribing and achieve greater use of generic 
drugs or improving procurement processes often by centralizing procurement (France, Italy and 
Spain), but also through tendering and selective contracting (Hungary and the Netherlands) or e-
prescribing systems, while a number of countries reported taking steps to intensify the use of Health 
Technology Assessment in making decisions about coverage (Spain, France, Germany and Norway) 
[6]. 
However, this approach may turn out to be unfeasible, and it anyway requires longer time horizons 
than afforded by the contingencies of the fiscal crisis that has stricken European countries quite 
hard since the burst of the financial bubble in 2008. We can refer to a combination of the second 
and third approaches (priority setting plus efficiency gains) as a “strategic response to the fiscal 
crisis”. More in detail, a strategic approach to cutbacks would entail “(i) a multiyear time frame, 
usually three to five years; (ii) a significant reallocation and reconfiguration of resources; (iii) 
substantial changes in organizational structure and work force activity; and (iv) a comprehensive as 
opposed to an ad hoc re-examination of the organization’s problems, mission, and structure” ([16], 
p. 691). All these elements require strong political commitment and organizational leadership. 
Evidence suggests that governments use a mix of across-the board and targeted cuts, and at a lower 
extent productivity or efficiency gains when facing resource constraints [12].  
3. Empirical setting and data collection 
To gain specific and up to date insights into the cutback management approaches effected in the 
healthcare sector across Europe during the extant fiscal crisis, the paper uses data from one section 
of the European-wide survey developed as part of the EU Seventh Framework programme research 
project “Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the future” (COCOPS, see 
www.cocops.eu) carried out in 2012. The survey included a total of 31 core questions which aimed 
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at capturing experiences and perceptions of public sector executives on public sector reforms 
(especially New Public Management - style reforms) and their effects (performance, but also on 
other factors such as public sector values/identities, coordination or social cohesion). In addition, 
one section of the survey was dedicated to understanding the impact of the fiscal crisis on public 
administrations and the responses deployed by public decision-makers. The survey was based on an 
elite-questionnaire jointly developed by an international research team and translated into different 
languages. The questionnaire was distributed to public sector executives working in central 
ministries and two policy sectors - employment and healthcare - in ten European countries, based on 
a full census strategy. The full census strategy was possible because of the extensive country-level 
mapping of public administrations developed by project partners and country experts [24]. The 
countries included were: Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Spain, The 
Netherlands and the UK. The survey was sent electronically and was accessible anonymously on a 
web platform and in few cases was also forwarded via postal invitation (France, Germany and the 
UK) to a total of about 19,600 high-ranking public executives. 
Executives of the first two top-hierarchical levels in the public bureaucracy - below politically 
appointed state secretaries - were surveyed in all selected countries (where deemed proper by the 
country-team, e.g. because of their influence on decision-making process due to the institutional 
arrangements of the country, the third hierarchical level was also included in the survey). In general, 
directors, board members and deputies comprise the first level, while executive managers make up 
the second level. Thus, the population reflects top and medium-high level civil servants in charge of 
policy-making and implementation rather than delivery of services who are most likely to hold the 
relevant knowledge regarding reforms and developments with the public sector of their country. 
Given the expected differences in the national administrations, some variation in the country 
samples was introduced. The guiding principle in creating the survey sample was to achieve 
comparability between all of the national samples [24]. 
4. Results 
A total of 760 valid filled-in questionnaires were received from officials working in the healthcare 
sector. It should be noticed that some countries are over-represented (notably Austria, France and 
Italy). The overall response rate of 30.68% is high for this type of surveys, particularly given the 
position at the top of the organisational hierarchy of respondents. Roughly two thirds of the 
executives included sample were male (62.6%), average age between 46 to 55 years old, and nearly 
90% holding a postgraduate degree (master level) (Table 1). The majority of respondents worked at 
regional or local governmental level public health organization (62.7%), reflecting the institutional 
configuration of most European health systems, decentralized to the level of Länder, Regions or 
Autonomous Communities in a number of countries (e.g., Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain). More 
than half of respondents (54.8%) had more than 20 year seniority within the public sector and 
another 28.3% reported to be working in the public sector for more than 10 years. Moreover, about 
70% had previously had an experience in the private (commercial) sector, while less than half of the 
respondents on average had any experience working in the non-profit sector.  
 [Table 1 about here] 
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Table 4 Sample descriptive statistics. 
N Variable 
 Descriptive statistics 
    Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 Gender 679 0.626 0.484 0.0 1.0 
2 Age  688 3.133 0.861 1.0 5.0 
3 Education Level 670 2.10 0.561 1.0 3.0 
4 Organization Type 746 2.99 1.19 1.0 5.0 
5 Seniority Pub. Sector 675 4.30 0.928 1.0 5.0 
6 Work Experience Private Sector  638 0.713 0.453 0.0 1.0 
7 Work Experience Non-Profit Sector 506 0.476 0.499 0.0 1.0 
 
4.1 Main approaches used to cutback management 
The questionnaire contained a few questions on the fiscal crisis and one is especially relevant for 
our research, as it is directly probing for managers’ perception about the extent of use of the three 
basic cutback tactics (i.e., cut-across-the-board, targeted cuts, and productivity or efficiency gains) 
aimed at realizing savings in the healthcare sector [10]. A total of 624 answers were collected for 
this item and Figure 3 shows response frequencies for all the countries included in the survey.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 3 Cutback measures at country level.  
 
Data suggests that both proportional and targeted cuts are the two most common options adopted to 
cope with the financial crisis, whilst developing policies aimed at attaining efficiency or 
productivity gains is the least popular approach. The survey reports targeted cuts to be the relatively 
most frequently employed (41.7%) followed by proportional cuts (37.2%), while only 21.2% of the 
respondents around Europe perceived productivity and efficiency gains as the general approach to 
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cutback management. Interestingly, Figure 3 reveals differences across jurisdictions, whereby 
certain systems display a strict preference for one of the three approaches, such as Hungary towards 
proportional cuts or Spain inclined to policies of targeted cuts, the majority of countries display a 
rather high within-country heterogeneity. 
Given this noticeable heterogeneity of individual responses, we investigate whether individual-level 
characteristics influence the likelihood of resorting to one or the other of the cutback approaches. 
Specifically, we are interested in understanding whether demographic characteristics of 
respondents, their position within the healthcare system and their work experience influence the 
probability of selecting one of the possible alternative cutback approaches.  
Moreover, we study whether the institutional configuration of the country healthcare system - 
Bismarck or Beveridge-like model - can help predict the likelihood of selection of one of the three 
general cutback management approach. By doing this we include the “influence of the past”, i.e. 
how the basic traits of the healthcare system as it has consolidated over the years affect executive 
choices; the theoretical perspective adopted here is one rooted in historical institutionalism, that 
puts emphasis on the assumption that institutions, once formed, shape the range of possibilities and 
have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the choices that will be made at all levels 
and phases of the policy cycle [25,26]. In general, a National Health System, or Beveridge-like 
healthcare model, is characterized by a centrally organized system, is funded by general taxation 
and relies predominantly on public providers, thus healthcare budget is strictly controlled and 
competes with the other government spending areas for maintaining its share of the public budget. 
On the other hand, Bismark-like healthcare systems are managed by health insurance funds 
regulated by the government but financed mainly through payroll deduction and services are 
provided by a mix of public and private providers. Among the Beveridge systems we include Italy, 
Norway, Spain and the UK; in the Bismark system countries we acknowledge Germany, France, the 
Netherlands and Austria, while Hungary and Estonia are categorised as moderate Bismark systems 
[27]. We include the latter model since both countries at the end of the 1990s have undergone a 
transition toward the establishment of a National Health Insurance Funds as a public independent 
legal body, thus re-establishing of overall health care planning at the national level [27].  
Finally, preference for certain government responses to the crisis may differ also due to level of 
available public healthcare resources (whether increasing or decreasing budget). Indeed, Bartle [28] 
argues that approaches to cuts depend on resource availability, whereby no growth in public 
spending would lead to the denial of the crisis and delayed responses; moderate decline in public 
spending would favour decremental approaches (like across-the-board cuts); severe revenue decline 
would trigger termination of programmes, reduction of services and layoffs. Hence, the magnitude 
of public healthcare expenditure growth during the crisis (annual change over 2009-2012) is 
included in the analysis.  
To predict the probability of selecting one of the three identified cutback approaches we have run a 
multinomial logistic regression with three uncorrelated nominal alternatives in the dependent 
variable: proportional cuts (1); productivity and efficiency savings (2); and targeted cuts (3). 
Estimates are carried out running multinomial logistic regression on Stata/SE 13.1 software. Cases 
with missing values on the dependent variable are deleted prior to the analysis. Data are set as 
paired-choice respondent (i.e., long shape) to analyse the probability of each respondent over the 
42 
 
 
 
three alternative outcomes, thus the number of observations is triplicated (624*3=1,872). Table 2 
shows the findings. Coefficients are reported as relative-risk ratio, or the exponential value of 
multinomial logit coefficients, where risk is measured as the risk of the outcome relative to the base 
outcome [29]. Results have to be interpreted in relation to the third category of the dependent 
variable (targeted cuts) which serves as our base category.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 Regression results: modelling cut back preferences  
      Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES 
Eff. 
savings 
Vs 
Target 
cuts 
Prop. cuts 
Vs 
Target 
cuts 
Eff. 
savings 
Vs 
Target 
cuts 
Prop. cuts 
Vs 
Target 
cuts 
Eff. 
savings 
Vs 
Target 
cuts 
 
Prop. cuts 
Vs 
Target cuts 
Male  1.287 1.117 1.222 1.223 1.180 1.067 
Less than 55years old 0.901 0.637** 0.901 0.642** 0.911 0.694* 
High Seniority Public Sector 1.166 0.781 1.143 0.820 1.210 0.861 
Decentralized Org. Position 1.557* 1.465** 1.471* 1.631** 1.589** 1.489** 
Bismark model 2.441*** 1.867***     
Full Bismark model   2.545*** 1.635**   
Moderate Bismark model   1.505 3.457***   
Yearly Public Health 
Expenditure Growth (2009-12) 
    1.180** 0.956 
       
Constant  0.199*** 0.753 0.216*** 0.653 0.290*** 1.071 
Log-likelihood chi2 test 29.69 
10 
0.0241 
40.39 
12 
0.0328 
21.34 
10 
0.0173 
d.o.f. 
Pseudo R2 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The regression results show that for respondent over 55 years old there is a significant higher 
probability of selecting across-the-border or proportional cuts rather than targeted one. But when 
controlling for executive seniority (37.5% correlation with age) the significance disappear, even 
though efficiency savings are preferred options compared to both proportional and targeted cuts for 
more senior executives. Looking at respondents’ organizational level, there is a consistent 
significant (p<0.05) higher probability that executives working in decentralized healthcare 
organizations (either at regional or local level) perceive proportional or linear cuts to be more 
frequently used rather than targeted or prioritized cost-containment measures compared to their 
colleagues working in central level organizations. When considering the country healthcare 
institutional arrangement, Bismark models compared to Beveridge models, display more than 
double the probability of selecting efficiency gains approach (i.e., trying to do the same with less 
resources – whereby safeguarding the levels of outcomes acquires priority status) compared to 
targeted cuts (p<0.001), and also a higher probability of choosing linear cuts rather than targeted 
one (p<0.001).  
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When we disaggregate Bismark model countries between full and moderate Bismark one (Model 2), 
the full Bismark cluster confirms the results of Bismark countries, with a less significant probability 
of proportional cuts preference (p< 0.05). On the other hand, the choice of introducing linear cuts 
gains 3.4 higher probability (p<0.001) among moderate Bismark countries (Estonia and Hungary) 
compared to Beveridge countries. Thus, among the more general Bismark cluster of countries, 
proportional cuts are driven by moderate Bismark model. 
Finally, Model 3 introduces how the annual trend in public healthcare resources (2009-12) 
influences the probability of selecting one of the three cutback management approaches across 
countries. It is interesting to notice that at increasing levels of available resources there is almost 
double the probability that countries introduce efficiency savings strategies compared to targeted 
cuts (p<0.05), and the direction of proportional cuts compared to targeted cuts is negative. This 
result suggests that European countries that could rely on an increasing level of public healthcare 
resource during the crisis tended to introduce some type of cutback management to keep the system 
efficient and sustainable.  
4.2 Measures and tools for public expenditure reduction  
The cutback management approaches that we have been examining so far represent the basic stance 
adopted by European countries for coping with the fiscal crisis. There is another piece of evidence 
which we deem to be of interest for the reader: the ‘concrete’ measures or tools specifically 
employed for coping with the reduction in public funding. Based on available literature review [1] 
[12], a list of management tools with which public organisations may cope with a reduction in 
funding have been identified. They are: staff layoffs; pay cuts; hiring freezes; pay freezes; reducing 
front line; reducing back office; cuts to existing programs; postponing or cancelling new programs. 
These tools are instruments for cutting operational expenditures (personnel and non-personnel 
expenditures) or program expenditures (altering scope and depth of programs and their financing) 
and they may be used in combination (for example, it is possible to both cut existing programs and 
postpone or cancel new programs).  
As discussed above, this is a further dimension of the study we have conducted: tools may refer to 
different basic approaches to cutback management: for example, cutting existing programs may be 
used as tools either for effecting cut-across-the-board or for achieving targeted cuts; as another 
example, reducing the back office may be done either as part of an efficiency-gain approach, to 
deliver the same outputs with less resources, or as part of a cutting – either linear or targeted – 
approach.  
A specific and distinctive question in the survey assessed how top executives in the public 
healthcare sector across Europe perceived the use of each of the cutback measures presented.  
Specifically, responses were given according to the 7 item Likert-scale, being 1= Not at all and 7= 
To a great extent. Because we are interested in discriminating responses between lower and higher 
bound in perception of use of the cutback instruments, results are aggregate as follow: 1 to 3 
represents low to moderate level while, 5 to 7 represents moderate to high level of implementation, 
while answers reporting the mean value equal to 4 on the Likert scale have not been included. 
Evidence is reported in Table 3.  
[Table 3 about here] 
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Note to Table 3: Gray shades represent Beveridge health systems. The question posed in the survey is the 
following: “In response to the fiscal crisis, to what extent has your organization applied the following 
cutback measures?”. 
One set of tools for cutting public spending involves intervening on personnel policies by reducing 
the number of civil servants, or redefining the employment conditions (tenure or pay). Also, 
limiting turnover (non-replacement of staff) and pay freezes are measures that governments employ 
to contain expenditures. These options can produce short-term positive impact on expenditure 
growth because of the high proportion of personnel costs (wages, salaries and other allowances) on 
overall healthcare expenditures (varying between 60-80% [30]), though they may be detrimental to 
morale and motivation of the staff. 
We observed (Table 3) that only three countries relied on staff layoffs to an important extent: 
Hungary, UK and Estonia, where respectively 87%, 63% and 47% of respondents reported to have 
observed a moderate to high introduction of measures for reducing the number of public healthcare 
employees. Also, cuts on salary are rarely introduced, with the exception of Spain and - once again 
- Estonia where the government mandated pay cuts at all organizational levels. Pay freezes are 
instead of more widespread usage, with (again) Estonia, Spain and the UK leading the group, but 
also other countries (Italy, France, The Netherlands) reporting extensive pay freezes. Reducing 
frontline presence in healthcare delivery system is a seemingly unpopular response to reduce costs 
(in no country public executives report in a majority way to have witnessed reductions of the front 
office), while downsizing back office functions is a much more frequently considered option, 
especially in the UK (74%), France (68%) and Hungary (63%).  
Considering program scope and program innovation, European countries are experiencing a 
massive postponement of new programs, whereby all countries, with the exception of Norway, 
report that new programs have been affected to a large extent. The Scandinavian country is the only 
one among the surveyed countries that did not report any perceived relevant health policy change 
due to the financial and fiscal crisis- perhaps for the very reason that Norway did not experience 
any fiscal crisis at all. More mixed is the picture concerning the cuts to existing programs, 
generally high but with country variation.  
4. Discussion  
To our knowledge, this is the first Europe-wide survey on public executives that aims at detecting 
trends in the health sector about the cutback management strategies effected during the fiscal crisis 
triggered by the burst of the financial bubble in 2008; in addition to providing descriptive evidence, 
in this article we make an attempt to investigate if and the extent to which the respondents’ 
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Italy 96% 4% 77% 8% 57% 27% 43% 38% 41% 50% 41% 40% 35% 46% 30% 63%
Norway 77% 15% 98% 0% 82% 7% 87% 0% 91% 2% 68% 14% 65% 22% 65% 24%
Spain 73% 20% 5% 88% 65% 18% 68% 22% 8% 88% 10% 76% 3% 88% 7% 85%
UK 33% 63% 75% 17% 44% 44% 11% 74% 4% 92% 11% 70% 23% 50% 11% 85%
Austria 100% 0% 92% 3% 77% 10% 52% 28% 57% 32% 43% 39% 26% 59% 40% 55%
Estonia 41% 47% 33% 63% 44% 34% 28% 59% 13% 88% 30% 47% 23% 58% 28% 56%
France 92% 4% 88% 6% 35% 45% 20% 68% 38% 50% 26% 61% 28% 59% 7% 86%
Germany 98% 0% 81% 10% 62% 17% 40% 40% 68% 21% 31% 49% 41% 52% 28% 60%
Hungary 3% 87% 53% 27% 54% 25% 17% 63% 71% 23% 23% 65% 13% 77% 3% 94%
The Netherlands 71% 19% 73% 14% 41% 27% 19% 57% 41% 45% 24% 62% 18% 64% 18% 77%
Total 82% 14% 76% 16% 55% 27% 39% 45% 45% 46% 33% 51% 30% 56% 24% 69%
Staff layoffs Pay cuts Hiring freezesPay freezes
Cuts to existing 
programmes
Postponing or cancelling 
new programmes
Downsizing back office 
functions
Reducing front line 
presence
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characteristics, the healthcare institutional arrangements and trends in available public healthcare 
resources are predictors of selecting one of the possible alternative cutback approaches. Moreover, 
we describe what concrete measures and tools countries introduced in the healthcare sector to cope 
with the crisis. 
Evidence reported in this paper reveals that a variety of cut back measures are deployed to confront 
the fiscal crisis in the public healthcare sector [2]. One key finding of the survey is that managers 
report that the actual supply of services was cut as an effect of cost-containment policies: this shows 
that the crisis lowers the capacity of healthcare universal systems to provide protection to citizens 
and signals that, in addition to the direct effects of the economic downturn on health, there is also an 
effect attributable to a reduction in the extension of the coverage of citizens’ needs.  The survey also 
shows that investments in future programs were reduced.  
Again, respondents unveil that the crisis has had a real impact on the health systems. The survey 
shows that countries have reacted differently to the crisis and also the picture portrayed by this 
study is one of differential responses across countries in the terms of the cutback management 
approach adopted and as regards the specific cost-containment tools effected. Some policy tools, 
howevere, were reported to have been more frequently deployed than others; specifically, reducing 
back-office activities is a widely employed instrument, perhaps because it looks more popular with 
the general public, as it may be seen as a way to reduce waste with no damage to users; indeed, the 
survey reveals that this strategy has been pursued widely. Clearly, given the complex nature of 
healthcare organizations and the variety of back-office activities needed to offer health services, 
such a measure may have important draw-backs not easily detectable in the short run, but with 
salient consequences in the medium-long term. Interventions to reduce front-line services were 
instead less popular, although in three countries (France, UK and Estonia) more than a third of 
respondents reported these interventions having been implemented.  
The health system administrative tradition - Beveridge-model or Bismarck-model - is to some 
degree relevant in explaining the approach to cutback management that has been adopted. As 
observed, managers in the UK, Spain, Italy and to a certain extent Norway favour an approach of 
targeted cuts according to the priorities (reducing funding for certain areas, while maintaining it for 
the prioritized ones), while top managers working within Bismarck-based health systems 
comparatively favour productivity and efficiency savings as response to the challenges posed by the 
crisis. The weight of the past and the basic configuration of the health system seem to bear some 
explanatory power in terms of the main stances in coping with a fiscal crisis. In Beveridge systems 
the benefit basket generally gives scope to delivery organizations to work on priorities and to 
actively manage demand while in Bismarkian systems levels of care are defined in terms of 
entitlements of the insured persons [31] and thus give less room to delivery organizations to define 
priorities. In this respect the role of waiting times in Beveridge system is telling.  
At country level, another main finding is that countries during the current crisis, even when 
operating at increasing levels of public healthcare resources, keep introducing efficiency gains 
strategies to contain rising costs. 
Finally, it has to be noted that the findings of this analysis are subject to limitations. First, we 
acknowledge a sample unbalance, whereby France, Italy and Austria are over-represented (France 
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with 167 valid responses, Italy and Austria with more than 100 responses versus an average of 62). 
This can wield an influence on models internal validity and, thus, results should be interpreted with 
some caution. Also, when we cluster countries according to their institutional arrangements 
(Beveridge vs full Bismark vs moderate Bismark) the sample responses are still quite unbalanced 
(226 vs 335 vs 63 responses respectively). Moreover, item non-response on some variables remains 
problematic, though we have no evidence of any link with answers to the dependent variable.  
An additional limitation is related to the respondents’ familiarity with the three cutback approaches 
and their definition. Specifically, when referring to targeted and proportional cuts, responses might 
suffer from a relatively unclear differentiation between the two, thus masking the real approach put 
forward by governments, or be a symptom of the country’s mixed cutback approach to the crisis in 
the health sector. As observed, the survey shows targeted and proportional cuts to be a balanced 
choice among respondent from Italy, Norway and The Netherlands, in the other cases one approach 
is markedly preferred against the other (Figure 3). Also, country level variables all treat the country 
in an aggregate way, thereby potentially overlooking regional (i.e. within-country) differences.  
At another and more “foundational” level, a limitation, inherent in this type of research designs, is 
the exclusive focus on the financial aspects of the impact of the crisis, specifically, on the patterns 
of responses adopted by the executives to cope with such impact. The dimensions of the outcomes 
is thus excluded from the scope of the analysis, at least directly; however, perceptions by executives 
about how the crisis struck the healthcare sector in the country and about the cutback management 
pattern may indirectly provide an indication of how the healthcare sector is being reshaped.  
Having recognised these limitations, evidence provided in this paper has produced empirical 
knowledge (so far unavailable) which may feed into the debates on the effects of the fiscal crises on 
the development of the healthcare sector across Europe, and on how public executives are coping 
with the crises.  
5. Conclusion 
The article provides an overview of the approaches adopted by top executives in the health sector to 
cope with the fiscal crisis. Diverse responses have been observed, and both respondent 
characteristics and country (system) level factors have been identified as predictors of differentiated 
response patterns.  
Beyond these considerations, one element stands out from our study, on which we would like to 
draw the attention of the reader: cost containment policies adopted have had an impact on the 
healthcare sector of many countries, and possibly on the actual scope of the universal healthcare 
coverage, and top managers had to cope with circumstances and make decisions that have impacted 
on the organisation of services – a state of affairs that cannot simply be placed under the label of the 
“reduction of waste”, as it is quite often claimed in political rhetoric. The crisis is reshaping in a 
number of respects the healthcare sectors of European countries– and in many regards not for the 
better, we might add.  
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Abstract: 
Cost-containment strategies influence public service provision, and outsourcing decisions is one 
possible approach. Using the case of hospital inpatient services, the present study contributes in 
three important ways. First, it presents a framework that distinguishes two forms of public 
outsourcing (i.e., contracting out to a public provider) and private outsourcing (i.e., contracting out 
to a private provider), thus, identifying a variety of possible service delivery configurations and 
contradicting the commonly held view of outsourcing as a dichotomous choice. Second, it argues 
that both public and private outsourcing have similar curvilinear independent effects on cost-
containment (with a different magnitude of the quadratic terms) but that combining the two 
(intermediate configurations) is costly. Third, the paper explains the existence and persistence of 
mixed configurations. The latter form is more costly, but it is justified on the basis of the specificity 
of the sector (e.g., the presence of institutional and political scrutiny) and its historical traditions, 
coupled with change-associated costs and smooth deviations from a status quo, and the ambiguous 
perceived effectiveness of different outsourcing decisions. Consequently, public and private 
outsourcing in principle might appear as effective strategies for improving cost-containment, but 
real-world constraints hinder such efficient configurations, which remain de facto unattainable.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, the necessity of reducing the gap between available financial resources 
and public expenditures has become one of the most urgent issues in the public sector, and cost 
containment in the provision of public services is a crucial objective of most policymakers. The-
relevance and urgency of the issue have influenced the development of different strategies, policies 
and managerial tools for controlling input costs while respecting a multi-dimensional constraint on 
the output (e.g., Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeklt 1991, Burke and Goddard 1990, Hodges 1997, 
Murray, Erridge, and Rimmer 2012)32. Outsourcing service delivery in the public sector is a widely 
applied and studied policy decision for improving cost efficiency and (simultaneously) maintaining 
or improving quality (Warner and Hefetz 2008, Snavely and Desai 2010, Awortwi 2012, Zhang and 
Sun 2012, Pouder and Golembiewski 1996, Nemec, Merickova, and Vitek 2005, Goodsell 2007, 
Johnston and Seidenstat 2007, Farneti and Young 2008, Mailly 1986, Prager 1994, Chalkley and 
Malcomson 1998, Levin and Tadelis 2010, Hefetz and Warner 2012, Alonso, Clifton, and Díaz-
Fuentes 2013). Outsourcing public service delivery shares most of its theoretical foundations and 
consequences with general contracting-out theory, which is mainly rooted in Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) (Williamson 1973, 1979) and Agency Theory (e.g., Logan 2000, Warner and 
Hefetz 2008). However, whereas private companies regularly outsource (total or partial production 
or delivery) to other private companies or to other private counterparties such as collective 
organizations or unidentified independent individuals (crowdsourcing), public services delivery 
includes a further dimension, namely, the public or private nature of the outsourcee. Therefore, 
outsourcing in the public sector is bi-dimensional. However, the literature on outsourcing in the 
public sector has generally adopted a one-dimensional approach. This view contributes to 
explaining why the effects of outsourcing on public spending vary considerably and their direction 
is often found to be ambiguous or non-linear (Enthoven 2004, Levin and Tadelis 2010, Zullo 2008).  
Moreover, observable configurations of public services production/delivery are often in 
contradiction with the cost-efficient configurations, according to the literature. For example, Zullo 
(2008) reported that in the U.S. motor bus sector, the average percentage of contracting was 26%, 
whereas the most efficient configurations were found to be the extreme ones (fully in-house or fully 
outsourced). The choice of such potentially inefficient configurations is to date understudied.   
32 Theoretical and empirical studies have approached the issue starting from different levels of analysis. Without 
pretending to provide an exhaustive and complete classification, three levels emerge. First, there is a micro (within 
organizations) level, which includes studies aiming at implementing an organization-level system of management tools. 
An instance of this class is the research stream on performance management in public organizations. Second, there is a 
macro (system) level, where the focus is on the financing system, the overall public or private nature of the service (e.g., 
should healthcare be an exclusively public service?). Third, there is a meso level, where the unit of analysis is the 
production and delivery of service. Privatization and outsourcing are the typical issues. With respect to research 
approaches, we can distinguish between positivistic approaches, which look for causal relationships involving policies, 
strategies and variables of system performance (e.g., Brekke, Holmas, and Straume 2011, Ferrario and Zanardi 2011); 
interpretive approaches that typically use qualitative methods to advance knowledge regarding either the success or the 
negative unpredicted outcome of public cost-containment actions (e.g., Bloching, Stock, and Scheel 2008, Ferrè, 
Cuccurullo, and Lega 2012); and descriptive analyses of public policies, which present critical assessments of public 
policies and use mixed positive and normative perspectives (e.g., Anessi‐Pessina and Cantù 2006, Battaglio Jr and 
Ledvinka 2009). 
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We address these two gaps using the case of outsourcing of hospital inpatient services within the 
Italian National Health Service (INHS). Longitudinal data on outsourcing decisions provide the 
grounds to explain i) the curvilinear relationship between outsourcing and public expenditures, ii) 
the choice of potential inefficient configurations (i.e., incremental changes toward potentially 
efficient equilibria can be costly) and iii) the marginal effectiveness of governing public spending 
through outsourcing, providing evidence that the greatest part of expenditure variability is 
determined by other (and particularly managerial) decisions.  
Overall, this study contributes to the debate on outsourcing in the public sector in three important 
ways. First, it defines outsourcing as a bi-dimensional choice. It distinguishes two forms of 
outsourcing—public outsourcing (i.e., contracting out to a public provider) and private outsourcing 
(i.e., contracting out to a private provider)—and it considers outsourcing as a continuous rather than 
a dichotomous option (the degree of outsourcing). Thus, a variety of possible configurations of 
service delivery emerges combining the nature of the outsourcee and the degree of outsourcing. In 
addition, by defining public expenditures as a function of two variables (plus controls) instead of 
one, the present study provides more complex predictions of the independent and combined effects 
of public and private outsourcing. In doing so, the study explains both certain inconsistencies in the 
results obtained by the extant literature and explores why public organizations may face ambiguity 
in choosing and maintaining the optimum levels of public and private outsourcing. 
Second, the paper builds on the efficiency argument made by New Public Management (NPM)33 
(Pollitt, Thiel, and Homburg 2007), which argues that both private and public outsourcing have 
similar curvilinear independent effects on cost-containment but that the combination of the two with 
intermediate configurations is costly. The main expected advantages of contracting out public 
services to private providers are related mainly to competition, with the introduction of a 
performance orientation, the business-like practices in public service provision and the relative 
absence of political interference. Along the same lines, the main expected advantages of 
outsourcing to other public organizations are related to economies of specialization, workforce 
retention, higher public service motivation, the easier development of behavioral norms in 
transactions (trust, cooperation, honesty and reciprocity) and limited quality shading (Jensen and 
Stonecash 2005). Although the empirical analysis suggests that mixed configurations of outsourcing 
are less effective in reducing spending, their presence among public service organizations is 
justified because of sector specificities (e.g., institutional and political scrutiny) and historical 
traditions that encourage smooth deviations from a status quo. Indeed, by analyzing the longitudinal 
data, we use outsourcing of hospital inpatient services as a time-varying decision, and observe the 
existence and persistence of mixed outsourcing decisions, providing evidence of an apparent 
inconsistency in the choice of outsourcing configuration.  
Third, the paper provides two interpretations, based either on incrementalism or on garbage can 
theory, for the observed behavior of Italian health service delivery.. In the incrementalist 
interpretation, service providers gradually move toward an efficient configuration, but because 
change is smooth, their path is long and timing is sometimes inconsistent. According to the garbage 
can approach, service providers tend to be chaotic and do not identify an ideal pattern over time, 
33 The NPM efficiency argument for outsourcing and privatization is based on public choice literature and property 
rights theory.  
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instead relying on solutions that apparently match the problems in the short run but remain loosely 
coupled with them.  
In conclusion, our findings suggest that public and private outsourcing in principle might appear as 
effective strategies for improving cost-containment, but real-world constraints hinder change 
toward such efficient configurations, which remain de facto unattainable. This condition raises the 
possibility that the often-claimed efficiency gains associated with outsourcing are illusory. 
The article is structured as follows. First, it maps outsourcing decisions in the theoretical tradition 
of TCE and characterizes outsourcing in public sector organizations using the NPM paradigm. 
Against this background, the paper elaborates and proposes three hypotheses on the effects of 
public and private outsourcing and their interaction. Second, it introduces the empirical setting, the 
provision of inpatient hospital services in the INHS, and describes the panel fixed-effect regression 
analysis and its results. Finally, in the discussion section, the paper contrasts the suggestions from 
the empirical analysis with the existence and persistence of mixed configurations using two main 
arguments: the smoothness of change (incrementalist theory) and ambiguity associated with time-
inconsistency (punctuated equilibria). 
2. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTRACTING OUT AND PRIVATIZATION: THE 
FOCUS ON PRIVATE AND PUBLIC OUTSOURCING 
Before describing the hypotheses development, we distinguish the concepts of contracting out and 
privatization to allow a multi-dimensional expansion of the former that should not be confused with 
the latter. Contracting out in the public sector is often conceptualized as the process through which 
the production and/or delivery of services are transferred outside the boundaries of the public 
sector. Public administrations opt for such arrangements in the hopes of reproducing the beneficial 
mechanisms of markets and quasi-market conditions in the provision of services such as 
transportation, education and healthcare. However, because the theoretical foundations of 
contracting out were developed without considering the public sector in particular,  the construct 
has been oversimplified by the failure to distinguish between two different choices: how much of 
the production and/or delivery should be outsourced to another organization and whether such an 
entity is public or private. In both cases, however, the final ownership of the service is public. 
Privatization strictu sensu, instead, represents a further step toward the inclusion of market 
mechanisms. Privatization implies a transfer from public to private hands of both asset ownership 
and service ownership. Privatization and contracting out also differ in the term of contract. 
Privatization is generally an irrevocable sale of a state-owned service34, whereas the arrangements 
for the provision of contracted-out goods and services do not last forever: the contract will specify a 
date upon which the arrangement ceases, absent a contract renewal (Jensen and Stonecash 2005). 
Furthermore, in the case of privatization, the government retains no governance control and no 
operating risk, although it usually retains regulatory control. By contrast, contracting out enables the 
government to retain control over the specification of the service, the management of the contract 
and the evaluation of the service provider’s performance.  
34 Privatized assets can be resold (even back to the government), but this is usually due to financial (or other) problems 
rather than to contractual obligation. 
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This paper explores contracting-out decisions in which the public sector maintains the final 
ownership of the service, distinguishing between public and private outsourcing. Using this 
approach, we contribute to the debate on the effects of the nature of the outsourcee in contracting-
out decisions, extending the mere efficiency argument of the benefits of specialization economies 
over transaction costs as suggested by TCE (David and Chiang 2009, Guerrero, Mossé, and Rogers 
2009).   
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Public outsourcing and Transaction Cost Economics 
Outsourcing in the public sector has its theoretical foundations mainly in TCE and NPM (Warner 
and Hefetz 2008). The former is mainly concerned with the cost-efficient boundary between 
hierarchy and market, whereas the latter is more multi-faceted and includes several dimensions of 
performance.  
According to TCE, spending can be controlled with make-or-buy decisions: organizations may find 
convenience in exploiting specialization economies (buy) (Levin and Tadelis 2010) or in reducing 
transaction costs (make) (Williamson 1973, 1979, 1975, 1985, 1987)35. Williamson argued that 
markets and bureaucracies are two alternative opportunities for organizing the production structure. 
In his view, the market is the most efficient organizational form unless the transaction costs in the 
market are higher than the organizational/production costs incurred by operating within a 
bureaucracy. The activities are, therefore, allocated to the most appropriate executor and are defined 
according to the efficient boundary between hierarchy and market. From this perspective, 
outsourcing in the public sector has often been associated with privatization mostly because the 
outsourcee was often a private, business-like organization.  
This biased perception has been fueled by the NPM literature, in which advocates of outsourcing 
treat privatization and public sector outsourcing indistinctly. According to Lynn (1998), the 
diffusion of NPM has left some constructive legacies, in which a prominent role is given to “a 
stronger emphasis on performance-motivated administration and inclusion in the administrative 
canon of performance-oriented institutional arrangements, structural forms and managerial 
doctrines fitted to particular contexts” (Lynn Jr., 1998). Performance is understood as a multi-
dimensional concept (Borgonovi, Fattore, and Longo 2012) that encompasses broad areas for which 
public administrations have been recognized as accountable, including effectiveness, efficiency, 
equity, ethics and legality (Xingzhu, David, and Sujata 2008). In the presence of strong downward 
pressures on the costs of public services, efficiency has become the prominent dimension against 
which public services providers’ performance is measured. In this circumstance, when the services 
delivered must conform to minimum quality constraints, a decline in spending results in an 
improvement in efficiency (Boyne 1998). Therefore, in this paper, we use slow-downs and declines 
in spending as a proxy for improved efficiency. However, in some cases, the nature of the 
outsourcee is seen as an important factor influencing the outsourcing decision, particularly when i) 
the hidden costs of private competition due to inefficient market structures or high prices are 
manifest and ii) the level of market failures in sectors such as education, healthcare and public 
35 The literature on outsourcing is broader than that reviewed in this paper, and consequences other than those on costs 
have been explored. For example, outsourcing has an impact on organizational capabilities (Agndal and Nordin 2009) 
and on volume flexibility, speed or product innovation (Dabhilkar et al. 2009). 
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transportation is considered to be inappropriate for transferring the service to private actors only 
(Kaboolian 1998). Under such circumstances, some studies have reported that contracting out to 
other public agencies36 appears to be an alternative option for both the in-house provision of service 
delivery and privatization (Levin and Tadelis 2010).  
Although the nature of the outsourcee might be an influencing factor for choosing the most 
appropriate configuration of service delivery, the mechanisms activated by public and private 
outsourcing partly overlap if competition is not included. Indeed, both public and private 
outsourcing impact the balance between transaction costs (public to public or public to private 
relationships) and organizational costs (managing complexity, missing specialization opportunities, 
changing organizational settings and functions). The transaction/organizational cost trade-off is, 
therefore, the main mechanism that allows for a change in public outsourcing to produce a variation 
in public expenditures, whereas private outsourcing can exploit the additional mechanism of 
competition. 
 
Based on this premise, and focusing on public outsourcing, we expect that the direction of its 
impact on spending varies mainly according to the sum of the transaction costs (and specular 
benefits of direct control) and the organizational costs (deriving from the management of 
complexity). The interplay between these two categories of costs may depend upon the status quo 
because both contracts and organizations have fixed institutional costs37. At different levels of 
outsourcing, the decision to expand or reduce the organizational boundaries may have different 
impacts on spending due to the different initial configurations, suggesting a non-linear relationship 
between outsourcing and public spending. For example, in a study focused on motor bus services 
(Zullo 2008), outsourcing was revealed to have a weak curvilinear association with the total cost, 
suggesting that the most cost-efficient agencies either fully contract out or entirely provide in-house 
service. Therefore, we expect intermediate configurations to be the more costly given the 
importance of the fixed costs of moving from the extreme and the lower capacity to exploit 
economies of scale. Therefore, we hypothesize an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
outsourcing and spending.  
In the case of inpatient hospital services, we expect that when public outsourcing is set at 
intermediate levels, there is an opportunity to reduce public expenditures by changing the level of 
public outsourcing; in other words, an intermediate level of public outsourcing is more costly than 
extreme configurations. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, public outsourcing has an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
public expenditures. 
 
Private outsourcing and the benefits of competition 
When the service is outsourced to private organizations, the outsourcing decision is more complex 
because it includes both the contracting-out component and the additional consequences of 
36The diffusion of NPM-style reforms has often produced the disintegration of vertically integrated bureaucracies and 
the substitution of arm’s-length executive agencies. 
37 For example, if the status quo is a pure market configuration, then the decision to insource back some activities may 
entail substantial fixed costs for acquiring production factors that may overrun the savings in the transaction costs. 
Similarly, from a pure bureaucracy configuration, outsourcing-related costs may include relevant transaction costs for 
beginning to interact with other institutional actors.  
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involving private providers in the public service production/delivery process. The impact of private 
outsourcing, therefore, is transmitted to public expenditures through an additional mechanism 
compared to public outsourcing, namely, the costs and benefits of introducing market-like dynamics 
(e.g., competition) into the system. Therefore, the arguments that motivated the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between public outsourcing and public expenditures also hold for private outsourcing. 
In addition, including private providers in public service production/delivery takes its motivation 
from the intended benefits of competition as a mediator of efficiency38; in this sense, private 
outsourcing appeals to citizens’ and politicians’ preferences for more cost-effective methods of 
service delivery (Leland and Smirnova 2009). Indeed, Pendleton (1999) found that private 
outsourcing and exposure to product market competition, when applied to local transportation, have 
produced efficiency gains through changes in labor management and industrial relations that made 
them more akin to those of competitive markets (Pendleton, 1999). However, the benefits of private 
outsourcing are not attained if the amount of outsourced capacity (i.e., the critical mass) is not 
sufficient to activate competitive mechanisms among private providers. Levin and Tadelis (2010) 
found that involving private players had a significant impact in improving efficiency only if the 
conditions exist for a competitive market to emerge (Levin and Tadelis 2010), whereas otherwise, 
the private ownership of the assets is not necessarily associated per se with higher efficiency. 
Evidence of such phenomena has also been observed in healthcare service delivery in which private 
hospitals are not necessarily associated with a higher efficiency level compared to public hospitals 
(Tiemann, Schreyögg, and Busse 2012)39. Therefore, competition is not granted by the mere 
presence of private actors in the service delivery system, but it additionally requires that enough 
space be given to private providers. According to Enthoven (2004), market opportunities should be 
strengthened enough to deliver efficient public services, i.e., private outsourcing is beneficial only 
when it is introduced at a significant level, whereas it can increase costs when its role is marginal 
(Enthoven 2004). Building on this relation, competition reinforces the transaction costs mechanism. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that private outsourcing exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
public expenditures, as in the case of public outsourcing, but we expect the curvilinear relationship 
to be sharper because the two mechanisms apply simultaneously.  
 
Hypothesis 2a. Ceteris paribus, private outsourcing has an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
public expenditures. 
 
Hypothesis 2b. Compared to public outsourcing, the curvilinear relationship between private 
outsourcing and public expenditures is sharper, i.e., the first-order coefficients are similar but the 
second-order coefficient of private outsourcing is higher in the module.   
 
Public and private outsourcing: a costly mix 
38On this point, it should be noted that the theoretical motivation for private outsourcing is generally not explicitly 
mentioned in private contracting-out tendering. Hodges (1997) shows that the promotion of competition is rarely stated 
as an objective of private outsourcing, and, where it is, it can lead to difficulties in drawing objective audit conclusions 
(Hodges 1997). Prager (1994) suggests that the contracting out of government services to private actors “will neither 
reduce government outlays nor increase government efficiency unless the decision makes economic sense. For example, 
a government authority may decide that downsizing is a political, not financial or economic, imperative, or outsourcing 
may serve as a threat to weaken the power of an entrenched bureaucracy or labor union” (Prager 1994). 
39This evidence is consistent with findings in other domains of public services, such as transportation (Zullo 2008).  
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The inverted U-shaped relationship between both public and private outsourcing and public 
expenditures is consistent with the TCE literature. However, because the two have never been 
studied as simultaneous and distinct choices, no evidence has been produced thus far on the 
consequences of mixing public and private outsourcing. In particular, no study has investigated the 
relationship between public expenditures and the two types of outsourcing. When designing and re-
designing public services, policymakers have, among other options, the opportunity to decide the 
degree of outsourcing and the extent to which it can be realized with private actors’ involvement 
(Figure 1). First, policymakers may choose not to outsource service delivery, therefore fully 
maintaining direct responsibility. Second, they can decide to totally or partially outsource the 
service either to public providers or to private ones. Finally, they can choose to totally or partially 
outsource the service to both public and private providers.         
---------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
According to Hypotheses 1 and 2a, each of the two options is effective in containing public 
expenditures when applied to a sufficient extent that allows benefits to override costs, whereas 
when they are only marginally introduced, their impact on expenditures may be detrimental. In 
other words, we argue that the more extreme the option, the more effective it is in reducing public 
expenditures. However, because we use a continuous and not a dichotomous concept of outsourcing 
(i.e., we refer to those cases where production and delivery are divisible), mixed configurations are 
also possible.  
Typically in the public sector, we observe that based on the organizations’ status quo, a share of the 
production/delivery can be directly provided by the public entity that is accountable for the service 
as a whole. This situation is noticeable in our example, in which service delivery is decentralized to 
regional healthcare services (RHSs) and local health authorities (LHAs). RHSs are accountable for 
healthcare services and can decide to directly provide a share of hospital services through LHA-
managed hospitals. In doing so, direct provision reduces the space for both public and private 
outsourcing and, following Hypotheses 1 and 2a, it hinders their effectiveness as cost-containment 
decisions. Moreover, at any level of public direct delivery, an increase in one form of outsourcing 
will necessarily reduce the space for the other. Therefore, the higher the level of public outsourcing, 
the lower the space for private players and the higher the initial transaction and agency costs 
(Warner and Hefetz 2008) incurred by their inclusion. Similarly, the higher the level of private 
outsourcing, the lower the space for public outsourcing and, consequently, the lower the benefit 
obtainable from specialization economies. In other words, the balance between the two outsourcing 
options is costly because it reduces efficiency gains that could have been realized by appropriately 
exploiting each alternative individually.  
 
Hypothesis 3. At any level of either public or private outsourcing, an increase in one of them makes 
the other potentially less effective in reducing public expenditures. 
 
The relational diagram that summarizes the three hypotheses is presented in Figure 2. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
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4. EMPIRICAL SETTING 
Public and private outsourcing in the Italian National Health Service 
This paper uses the INHS to empirically test the three hypotheses. The choice of the empirical 
setting is motivated by three main arguments. First, the INHS represents a favorable setting for 
studying outsourcing decisions because, in Italy, the healthcare service is decentralized at the 
regional level and the regions are accountable for health spending and efficiency-improving policies 
(Anessi‐Pessina and Cantù 2006). As a consequence, Regional Health Services (RHS) show a 
substantial level of variability that is both cross-sectional and over time (cfr. Figure 3). Second, the 
choice of this setting is particularly convenient because it makes it possible to clearly disentangle 
public and private outsourcing decisions. Third, the healthcare sector is particularly important for 
the national economy and public expenditure. Indeed, in 2011, the total public health expenditures 
in Italy accounted for approximately 7.1% of GDP and 14.7% of total public expenditure (Armeni 
and Ferré 2013). 
Data on regional-level outsourcing decisions 
Public outsourcing and private outsourcing are measured as the proportion of regional hospital beds 
managed by public and private independent hospitals, respectively. The remainder comprises 
hospital beds directly managed by LHAs. Data refer to the period between 1997 and 2010. The 
analysis includes 294 region-time observations. Figure 3 graphically depicts the position of RHS in 
the mix of outsourcing levels over the 14-year period. As expected, at least one RHS is represented 
in each quadrant of the matrix.   
Overall, according to this representation, the RHS appear to be predominantly public service-based 
with a relatively low presence of internal markets mechanisms, i.e., separating the responsibility of 
buying healthcare from the provision of services within the boundaries of the public sector 
(quadrants 1 and 2). Only a small number of RHS (e.g., Calabria and Lazio) displace a rather high 
level of private outsourcing over time (quadrants 3 and 4). The pattern of change reveals that public 
or private outsourcing decisions cluster around two main processes: first, a rather unsystematic 
pattern of the development of public and private outsourcing (see Calabria and Lazio); second, a 
smoother progression of the uptake of quasi-market mechanisms (see Veneto, Marche, Piemonte 
and Toscana) until 2006-2007, followed by a gradual rebound in public outsourcing. Overall, 
ambiguity is evident, and no systematic pattern of outsourcing decisions emerges. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
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5. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Variables 
The dataset is structured on a region-year basis. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
per capita public health expenditures40. The main independent variables introduced are public 
outsourcing, measured as the proportion of hospital beds managed by public independent hospital 
(Lo Scalzo et al. 2009), and private outsourcing, measured as the proportion of hospital beds owned 
by private hospitals and for which a reimbursement contract has been signed with the RHS or with 
the LHA (according to the regional institutional setting)41. As control variables, we include the 
following:  
• Total per capita hospital beds available in the region to account for possible scale effects; 
• Per capita regional gross domestic product (GDP) because public health expenditures are 
correlated with local income (Hitiris and Posnett 1992, Gerdtham and Löthgren 2000); 
• Percentage of elderly patients in the region. Older patients typically require more costly 
healthcare services compared to the rest of the population (Lubitz et al. 2003), and, 
therefore, their share should be controlled for. There is also high variability of the elderly 
population across the RHS, which ranges from 12.9% (Campania – 1997) to 28% (Friuli-
Venezia Giulia – 2005); cfr. Table 2; 
• Per capita public health deficit, which measures the degree of the financial stability of the 
RHS. There is a mutual influence between deficit and health expenditure, as regions with 
higher deficits are also the ones that experience higher pressures on health spending;  
• A dummy for regions where high deficits have led to the adoption of a healthcare 
turnaround plan. Because turnaround plans are explicitly designed to reach efficiency and 
stability, we expect their impact on public health expenditures to be negative; 
• The number of months in every year with a left-affiliated regional government in power. 
Although the literature has not provided clear-cut results for the direction of the influence of 
governments’ political affiliation (Imbeau, Pétry, and Lamari 2001), we include the control 
in order to nullify a possible political effect. 
The variables’ definitions and sources are summarized in Table 1. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Analysis 
40 We used the logarithmic transformation for interpreting model coefficients as the percentage of impact, which 
facilitates cross-regional comparisons. 
41 Private hospitals that operate outside public reimbursement are excluded from the analysis for three reasons. First, 
they represent a marginal phenomenon in Italy; second, their mapping in Italy is still incomplete; third and most 
important, they are not included in public decisions of outsourcing and privatization unless they agree to the 
reimbursement scheme, which would allow them to enter our sample. 
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Data are set as a region-year panel and use fixed-effects panel regression analysis to identify the 
impact of public and private outsourcing after having excluded regional time-invariant factors (e.g., 
institutional models of healthcare). The model includes yearly dummies to control for trends and 
year-specific exceptional phenomena. This approach aims to reduce most of the endogeneity issues 
by explaining the greatest part of the variability through the controls and leaving the remainder to 
the independent variables (public and private outsourcing, their squared terms and the interaction 
between the two). Based on this approach, small increments in the R-squared (within) arising from 
the inclusion of independent variables are likely, and this would make the R-squared a poor 
indicator of the statistical appropriateness of richer models. Therefore, we test the gradual inclusion 
of independent variables using the log-likelihood ratio tests for nested models42.  
Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 2.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert table 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
6. RESULTS  
We estimated five models using linear panel data regression analysis with regional and time-fixed 
effects (Table 3). In model 1, only the fixed effects for time and region are included. As expected, 
the variability of per capita health expenditure is mainly explained in terms of regional time-
invariant factors and time trends. Only 3% of the variability is unexplained. Model 2 includes all 
control variables. Even when the increment in the R-squared is modest (+0.5%), the log-likelihood 
test supports the hypothesis that model 2 is nested in model 1 (p<0.01), and therefore, we accept the 
inclusion of the control variables. Models 3 and 4 separately include public outsourcing and private 
outsourcing, respectively, together with their squared terms. Model 2 is nested in both Model 3 and 
Model 4 (p<0.01). Finally, Model 5 tests all the variables together and, given that the test for nested 
models rejects the null hypothesis of no-nesting both with respect to Model 3 (p<0.01) and to 
Model 4 (p<0.05), we refer to this model for testing our hypotheses. It is notable that the regional 
and time-fixed effects already explain most of the variability, leaving to the independent variables 
the 3% not explained by the baseline model (see discussion).  
Hypothesis testing 
---------------------------------- 
Insert table 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 1 predicted an inverted U-shaped relationship between public outsourcing and public 
health expenditures. In both Model 3 and Model 5, there is evidence of a curvilinear relationship. 
The sample provides evidence for both the increasing and the decreasing parts of the parabola (cfr. 
Figure 4, top, left graph). Hypothesis 1 is, therefore, supported by the model results. Hypothesis 2a 
predicted a similar relationship for private outsourcing. According to Models 4 and 5 and the 
within-sample evidence of the parabola in Figure 4 (top, right graph), the results are also consistent 
42 Likelihood ratio tests compare two models provided that the simpler model is a special case of the more complex 
model (i.e., “nested").  
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with Hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2b is relative to the second-order coefficients. Models 3, 4 and 5 
support a more sharply sloped parabola in the case of private outsourcing. Consequently, 
Hypothesis 2b is also supported. To test Hypothesis 3, we added the interaction coefficient. 
Consistent with the hypothesized effect, the coefficient is positive and significant (p<0.05), 
supporting Hypothesis 3. To investigate the joint effect of public and private outsourcing on per 
capita public health expenditures, we constructed a three-dimensional surface plot based on Model 
5 (see Figure 5). The surface of the plot has the maximum in the background, confirming a sharper 
curvilinear impact of private outsourcing43. The scatter plots in Figure 4 and the surface plot in 
Figure 5 both indicate that increasing either private or public outsourcing is less beneficial when the 
other is in place.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert figure 4 and figure 5 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Further results 
With respect to our control variables, the per capita hospital beds variable has the expected positive 
effect on public per capita health expenditures. An increase in the number of available hospital beds 
tends to lead to an increase in per capita spending. GDP per capita is negatively correlated with 
public health expenditures, indicating a countercyclical public expenditure policy pattern. The 
percentage of elderly patients also has the expected positive effect on public per capita 
expenditures; however, the effect does not seem to be highly significant, implying that public health 
expenditures are not primarily driven by the consumption/use of services by the elderly. The level 
of per capita health deficit has a strong significant positive relationship with public expenditures. 
That is, the greater the magnitude of financial distress in regional health expenditures, the higher the 
level of per capita health expenditures. Moreover, contrary to the expected positive relationship, the 
presence of formalized recovery plans produces a non-significant impact on health expenditure 
levels. Finally, the regional party affiliation has a small but statistically significant relationship with 
per capita health expenditures. The data show that leftist regional governments are negatively 
correlated with the level of per capita public health expenditures. 
7. DISCUSSION: INCONSISTENCY IN THE OUTSOURCING CONFIGURATION 
CHOICE 
The simulated impact of public and private outsourcing reported in Figure 5 suggests that 
efficiency-improving decisions may be different depending on the status quo of the service 
configuration. For example, starting from a configuration with no outsourcing (graphically, the left 
bottom angle of the plane), the most effective decision for reducing expenditure would be to 
introduce private outsourcing, preferably to a large extent. However, if the status quo is 
characterized by a substantial level of public outsourcing coupled with no private outsourcing (e.g., 
the top left corner of the plane), activating the latter might increase public expenditures unless the 
43 To graphically disentangle the effects of private outsourcing, it is possible to observe the curves of the derivatives 
(the lines on the surface) that are parallel to the private outsourcing axis. Similarly, the curves parallel to the public 
outsourcing axis summarize the impact of public outsourcing on public expenditure for different levels of private 
outsourcing. 
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amount of services outsourced to private providers is sizeable. To see this effect, take for example 
the curve at the maximum level of public outsourcing, when private outsourcing is zero in the 
background. Starting from some point in the middle of the plane, i.e., configurations with mixed 
public and private outsourcing, there is more than one direction in which public expenditure could 
be decreased. Therefore, different options may appear effective (e.g., increasing both forms of 
outsourcing, increasing only one, increasing one and reducing the other or decreasing both). 
However, a high degree of effectiveness would often require substantial deviation from the status 
quo, necessitating deep institutional and organizational change.  
The empirical data (Figure 3) reveal that RHSs choose and maintain theoretically inefficient 
models: mixed configurations with non-zero levels of both public and private outsourcing and small 
changes over time. This finding is not surprising because the public governance literature 
recognizes the increasing number of hybrid organizational models that permit the blending of public 
and private sector resources (Peters and Pierre 1998). From our setting, two alternative explanations 
can be envisaged. First, regions could choose the mix between public and private outsourcing 
without knowing what impact on public expenditure is to be expected. Second, reasons other than 
efficiency could drive outsourcing decisions and the speed of adjustment. The former explanation 
relies on the fact that regional policies apparently contradict the empirical model-based suggestion 
that extreme configurations are more efficient. In fact, extreme configurations are not prevalent, and 
generally, regions tend to balance in-house service delivery, public outsourcing and private 
outsourcing. However, if they were aware of the model-based suggestions, they would behave 
accordingly. Indeed, extreme configurations, even if theoretically more efficient, are unlikely to be 
implemented, unless they are already coincident with the status quo, for two reasons. First, 
reverting to a full in-house provision would imply the total rejection of NPM and the exclusion of 
important NHS stakeholders (e.g., private hospitals). Conversely, outsourcing the entire service to 
private hospitals would require a dramatic institutional and political change. Therefore, we believe 
that the latter explanation is appropriate and that the highest efficiency, even if theoretically 
affordable through outsourcing decisions, is an illusion in practice. Comparing the actual dynamics 
of public and private outsourcing with the statistical evidence reported above requires us to analyze 
three tendencies that characterize the behavior of RHSs. The first tendency is relative to the choice 
of a mixed configuration as the status quo. The search for the “middle position” is a common thread 
in public organizations because the balance between citizens’ accountability and engagement and 
efficiency and market management is realized as a process of accumulated trade-offs (Warner and 
Hefetz 2008). Italian RHSs generally choose intermediate configurations for inpatient hospital 
services (in Figure 3, all the displayed regions are far from the axes44). The second tendency is the 
smoothness of change. Policymakers have shown that efficiency-improving decisions on the levels 
of public or private outsourcing can be identified but only smoothly implemented. The regions 
reported in Figure 3 generally show a tendency to increase both levels of outsourcing over time, 
with a slight preference for private outsourcing. Finally, the third tendency reveals that changes in 
outsourcing levels appear to occur continuously, leaving the organization unable to fully complete 
the path toward one or the other end of the outsourcing continuum, thus generating non-linear 
44 Some regions, not reported in Figure 3, show either no private or no public outsourcing. However, none of them, 
excluding Valle d’Aosta before 2009, has reported a null proportion on both axes.  
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patterns of evolution (in particular, see the paths of Lazio and Calabria in Figure 3). We explain 
such evidence in terms of ambiguity and time inconsistency. 
The choice of a mixed status quo45 
NHSs are characterized by the direct provision of services. However, they may decide to outsource 
the management of certain production or delivery processes to other providers (public, private or 
public-private mixed entities), thus generating incentives to specialization in each outsourced phase. 
In recent years, the necessity of reducing production costs has pushed universal healthcare systems 
to reconsider the possibility of moving organizational boundaries by exploiting specialization 
economies and inducing competition (by privatization or private outsourcing in our case) under 
both a rationality constraint46 and a quality constraint47. Burke and Goddard (1990), building on 
TCE, argue for the appropriateness of an intermediate level of outsourcing. In particular, they 
verified the occurrence of five conditions48 that justify the failure of a pure-market configuration of 
transactions in the British NHS. As these conditions are highly dependent upon the peculiarity of 
the sector rather than of the country, their conclusions can be fairly generalized to the Italian case49 
because both NHSs cluster under the Beveridge model (Saltman and Figueras 1997). 
The first condition is bounded rationality, an issue that becomes increasingly important with the 
growth of complexity in activities and technological advancements in healthcare. The second 
behavioral assumption is opportunism: even if it “has not traditionally been dominant in healthcare 
[as] there has been an emphasis on ethical behavior and moral commitment” (Burke and Goddard 
1990), most actors involved in the resource allocation process reported experiencing opportunistic 
behaviors. Third, transactions are restricted in frequency because of the limited number of 
contracting parties. This characteristic is highly desirable in healthcare because strong 
standardization requirements are necessary to ensure a minimum of quality and equity within the 
system. However, this benefit comes at the costs of greater bargaining power and discretionality in 
the final choice50. Fourth, complexity and uncertainty are inherent to medical activity and, by 
extension, to the whole NHS. This situation requires a leading actor who is accountable for the 
performance of the whole system. Finally, healthcare is also characterized by the significant 
presence of idiosyncratic investments (staff, education, equipment) that are made in a quasi-
monopsonistic market, requiring ad hoc governance systems that are different from those of a pure 
market (Williamson 1979). All of these elements lead to the prediction that the market, even if is 
45 We refer to the status quo as the first observation in our sample, not as an initial choice. In 1997, the first observed 
year, the NHS was already an established system. 
46 That is, the savings from outsourcing are greater than the new transaction costs. 
47 In Italy, the minimum granted services (LEA, Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza) are defined and listed. 
48 They refer to the conditions under which the market is likely to be a less efficient allocator of resources. The first two 
are behavioral conditions: bounded rationality and opportunism. The remaining three relate to (i) a low frequency of 
transactions, (ii) a high complexity and uncertainty surrounding transactions and (iii) a high degree of enduring 
idiosyncratic investments. 
49 Note that Rehnberg’s (1990) study of the organization of the Swedish healthcare system concludes that the degrees of 
asset specificity and of uncertainty are poor predictors of the degree of externalization. Based on TCE, he initially 
predicted that the production of asset-specific and uncertain services would be internalized, whereas the production of 
standardized services would be externalized. In fact, an integration pattern was found in which not only asset-specific 
transactions were internalized but so were the transactions of standardized services offered by a large number of sellers 
(Rehnberg 1990). 
50 This is also in light of the uncertainty regarding the demographic, epidemiological and technological patterns and 
outcomes of care. 
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partly desirable, is not the most globally efficient organizational form for universal healthcare 
system models. We can, therefore, explain why intermediate levels of outsourcing are found as the 
prevalent status quo, which may differ across regions depending upon the strength and the manner 
in which the conditions described above appear and interact together.   
The smoothness of change 
TCE helps explain why regions choose inefficient initial organizational configurations. However, it 
cannot fully explain why regions adopt such different initial configurations and, most importantly, 
why they do not tend to converge quickly on a common configuration but, rather, show 
considerably smooth patterns of change. Additional rigidities are at play. In the case of public 
organizations, two important sources of rigidities are institutions and relationships (Lane 2000). 
Indeed, TCE is often criticized by organizational sociologists because it operates with an under-
socialized conception of human actions (Ferlie 2007) and overestimates the role of governance 
structure and contracting rather than social relationships as the driving forces for decisions. 
Moreover, TCE ignores the proposition that behaviors are embedded in social relationships 
(Granovetter 1985), undervaluing the interdependence among social actors. Therefore, any status 
quo shows more rigidities than do the systems we expect in an under-socialized world. Introducing 
the social perspective into the analysis allows us to explain the gradual evolutionary pattern of 
public and private outsourcing decisions by RHSs. At any point in time, the potentially efficient 
configuration would not be immediately reachable were it to require a dramatic change in both the 
institutional and relational frameworks. For example, insourcing back certain activities determines 
the necessity of remodeling the supply structure by building or buying new public hospitals and 
establishing relationships with additional suppliers. Hence, small changes rather than dramatic ones 
are likely. This circumstance is also consistent with Lindblom’s incrementalist theory of decisions 
in public management (Lindblom 1959, 1979). The consequences of smooth changes may affect the 
consistency of outsourcing decisions over time. 
Ambiguity and time inconsistency 
In case the status quo is placed within the space of mixed configurations, a unique efficiency-
improving strategy may not exist, but many options for the balance between public and private 
outsourcing could be available. This occurs, for example, when a region is near the maximum point 
of one of the partial derivatives’ curves describing the public outsourcing-expenditure relationship 
for a given level of private outsourcing. Under such a condition, either an increase or a decrease in 
public outsourcing, or even a substantial increase in private outsourcing, may induce a decline in 
public expenditures. Policymakers facing similar situations must cope with a first dimension of 
ambiguity derived from the presence of multiple and different potentially effective actions. A 
second dimension of ambiguity is relative to the uncertainty of the effect, which makes the 
comparison among different alternatives less precise. Finally, even when a more convenient 
strategy is identifiable, it may carry costs other than the current production/delivery-related ones, 
such as the costs associated with changing the institutional framework. The above-mentioned points 
suggest that efficiency-improving decisions are potentially ambiguous (Warner and Hefetz 2008).  
In addition to ambiguity, smooth patterns of change may be time inconsistent, which means that the 
objective configuration may change during the process of approaching it. A smooth process 
generates a repositioning of the status quo at every point in time. Consequently, new efficiency-
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improving decisions may emerge that are not necessarily consistent with the process apparently 
followed up to that point (in Figure 3, both Lazio and Calabria seem to not follow a clear and 
consistent pattern over time). Time inconsistency may also originate from institutional and political 
factors. The former may include the costs of downsizing the level of fixed production factors, lack 
of control, workforce rigidities or the costs of establishing a new set of agreements with other 
counterparties (Young and Macinati 2012). By contrast, political factors are related to the need to 
increase the consensus in specific phases of political cycles (Lane 2000).   
In conclusion, even though RHSs generally exhibit a baseline trend over time toward efficiency-
improving decisions (cfr. Figure 3), their implementation is smooth and often adjusted or changed 
before the efficiency-improving configuration is reached, generating non-linear patterns of 
evolution. Any interpretation of these patterns must made in light of the fundamental question 
regarding the existence of steady states. Are there (sooner or later) reachable efficient 
configurations? Or, instead, is this instability perpetually moving between waves of opposite 
decisions, with no long-lasting matching between problems and solutions? 
Arguments in support of the first interpretation may be built upon incrementalism (Lindblom 1959, 
1979) and by using the concept of punctuated equilibria (True, Jones, and Baumgartner 1999)51. 
Adopting this theoretical lens, efficiency is in principle obtainable in the long run, but the path is 
not short or linear, and the excessive amount of time may be perceived as a signal of impossibility. 
It is nevertheless possible that, in some cases, a region is unable to make decisions that would 
require a drastic change in the model, for example, because of institutional and social rigidities. 
This is the case, for example, in Sicilia. Instead, if punctuated equilibria exist, it is possible that time 
inconsistency emerges to a greater extent. This is the case, for example, in Lazio, where the high 
starting level of private outsourcing was followed by a decreasing trend and subsequent small 
rebound in 2003. Following the regional hospital downsizing policies, the region displaced a 
decreasing level of both public and private outsourcing coupled in the 2004-2010 period with a 
noticeable increase in public outsourcing (from 31% to 40%). The second interpretation of this 
evolution is consistent with the garbage can model (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). Indeed, at 
least two of the typical conditions that favor the emergence of garbage cans are met: in our case, 
both the technology is unclear (rejecting the incrementalist view, there is no clear rule to reach 
efficiency) and preferences are problematic to the extent that, beyond the objective of efficiency, 
quality constraints and other relevant dimensions of performance do not allow for the identification 
of a univariate objective function. Fluid participation, the third basic property of systems in which a 
garbage can emerges, is not very applicable at such a macro context, but it is nevertheless 
observable, extending the analysis to the whole network of stakeholders instead of focusing only on 
the appointed policymaker. According to this view, no efficiency is obtainable by definition of the 
dynamics because regional strategies for improving efficiency will be inherently chaotic, highly 
unpredictable and ineffective in the long run. 
 
 
51 Punctuated equilibria in social theory is a method of understanding change in complex social systems, particularly 
how policy changes and the development of conflicts seem to progress in extended periods of stasis, punctuated by 
sudden shifts with radical change. 
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8. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study provides new theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature on public sector 
outsourcing, informing the debate on the relevance of the nature of the outsourcee and on the 
consequences of disentangling public and private forms of outsourcing. The quantitative analysis 
has some limitations. First, in the case of the INHS, public outsourcing is not conceptually 
homogeneous across regions. In particular, quasi-market systems differ considerably in the degree 
of separation (institutional and financial) between hospitals directly managed by LHAs and public 
hospital enterprises. Therefore, our measure is a potentially heterogeneous proxy of public 
outsourcing and should be treated with care when discussing normative implications. This 
limitation does not, however, impair the analysis provided, given that the focus of this paper is not 
the identification of an optimal decision but, rather, the interpretation of public choices that 
apparently deviate from theoretically efficiency-improving consistent decision making. Second, 
there are possible concerns regarding the generalizability of our results. In our study, we used the 
Italian hospital inpatient service sector, which exhibits substantial peculiarities with respect to both 
the content (type of service provided: collective public service) and the country (type of healthcare 
system). Clearly, a replication of our findings in other comparable contexts of high public-private 
collaborations, such as public transportation and waste management, is needed to establish their 
external validity.  
Notwithstanding some limitations, hospital inpatient service can be considered a relevant case 
because of the possibility of clearly distinguishing the two forms of outsourcing given the different 
institutional identity of the two options. Moreover, the choice of studying the healthcare setting is 
justified by the substantial burden that public healthcare expenditures have on total government 
expenditures (15% on average in European countries and 21% in the U.S. in 2010 (Armeni and 
Ferré 2013)) and their increase over time, which has led governments to implement tighter cost-
containment measures. Finally, our analysis has shown that the greatest part of the variability in 
public expenditures does not derive from outsourcing decisions, which contribute marginally to 
cost-containment (Alonso, Clifton, and Díaz-Fuentes 2013).  
This evidence carries an important consequence for policymakers, emphasizing the management-
based view of cost-containment policy decisions. However, even if marginal, the impact of 
outsourcing in its two forms is statistically significant and is an available option for exercising 
managerial discretion at the regional level. Indeed, the heterogeneous pictures of outsourcing 
decisions and their evolution over time suggest that decision-makers at the regional level are 
characterized by different levels of dynamic managerial capabilities while being confronted with 
similar challenges posed by the external environment (Adner and Helfat 2003).  
We suggest that further research should take two approaches. First, it should take a theoretical 
approach that addresses the ultimate nature of the apparently inconsistent behaviors of public 
organizations’ outsourcing strategy (chaotic or incremental). Second, from a practice-oriented 
perspective, the quantification of the impact of outsourcing decisions in different public services 
could help policymakers recognize and appreciate the magnitude of the potential effects of public 
and private outsourcing. As a consequence, policymakers would have a tool for better informing the 
balance between managerial and structural change instead of simply relying on the paradigm of 
market or quasi-market configurations.  
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9. CONCLUSION 
Our analysis extends the study of public sector cost-containment decisions in quasi-market contexts 
by showing that i) both public and private outsourcing levels can be considered efficiency-
improving decisions; ii) the mechanisms explaining improvements only partly overlap, and thus 
these two choices can be considered separate; iii) regions or public administrations generally adopt 
different intermediate configurations; iv) the modification of decisions regarding the levels of 
public and private outsourcing, there are embedded preexisting social structures that make change 
smooth; and v) efficiency-improving patterns of decisions may be ambiguous and time inconsistent. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1: Models of privatizing and outsourcing 
 Low private outsourcing High private outsourcing 
 
Low public outsourcing 
 
 
Public production / 
delivery 
 
Private outsourcing 
 
High public outsourcing 
 
Public outsourcing 
 
Mixed Public - Private 
outsourcing 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical model  
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Figure 3: Public and private outsourcing of inpatient hospital service delivery over 14 years 
(1997-2010) in some Italian regions 
 
Note:  
- The complement to 100% of the sum of public outsourcing is the portion of inpatient service 
delivery held by LHA hospitals; 
- The intersection of axes is arbitrary and has only descriptive value; 
- Yearly observations have been connected with a smooth line to facilitate the identification of 
regions; 
- In this figure, we do not report years; we only indicate the starting and ending year of the 
analysis. Even if we lose the direction of change, we are interested in mapping the overall 
range of regional variation of the outsourcing mix.  
- Some regions are not reported for readability reasons (scale and overlapping position). 
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Figure 4: Scatter charts of observed relationships among public outsourcing, private 
outsourcing, their interaction and public health expenditures  
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Figure 5: Surface plot of public expenditures with private and public outsourcing 
 
Note: the analysis has only descriptive value and must be considered a complement of the 
regression analysis. In particular, in these graphs, the impact of the control variables is not 
eliminated. The simulation was carried out using the estimated coefficients for 2010 and Piemonte 
(the reference region), allowing both independent variables to range between 0 and 50%. The 
simulation does not take into account the control variables, and, therefore, the scale on the left axis 
is not reported.  
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Table 1: Variables, measures and sources 
Variable Measure Source 
Per capita healthcare expenditure 
(ln) 
ln of per capita public healthcare 
expenditure 
Reports of the 
Osservatorio 
sull’Aziendalizzazione 
della Sanità in Italia 
(OASI) (various years) 
Public outsourcing (%) 
Share of hospital beds managed by 
public independent hospital 
enterprises (aziende ospedaliere) 
Ministry of Health and 
OASI observatory 
Private outsourcing (%) 
Share of hospital beds managed by 
private hospitals but reimbursed by 
the region (privati accreditati) 
Ministry of Health and 
OASI observatory 
Total per capita hospital beds (x 
1000 inhabitants) 
Sum of hospital beds directly 
managed by LHAs, hospital beds 
managed by public hospital 
enterprises and hospital beds 
managed by private hospitals but 
reimbursed by the region, divided by 
the regional population in thousands 
Ministry of Health and 
OASI observatory 
Per-capita GDP (x 1000 euros) 
Total regional annual income per 
capita measured in thousands of 
euros 
Italian Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT) 
% of elderly residents (>65 yo) % of population with more than 65 years ISTAT 
Per-capita public health deficit (x 
1000 euros) 
Per capita regional public health 
deficit measured in thousands of 
euros 
OASI reports (various 
years) 
Turnaround plan 1 if region i has an active turnaround plan at time j 
OASI reports (various 
years) 
Left government Number of months in the year with a left-affiliated regional government 
Ministry of internal 
affairs 
      
Observations 294   
Number of Regions 21   
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
N Variable Descriptive statistics Correlations 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Per capita public health expenditure  1,508.5 327.8 803.3 2,243.3 
        
2 Public outsourcing (%) 26.7% 19.0% 0.0% 75.8% -0.13* 
       
3 Private outsourcing (%) 17.9% 10.9% 0.0% 43.2% 0.05 0.08 
      
4 Total per capita hospital beds 4.1 0.8 2.9 6.9 -0.50* -0.25* 0.02 
     
5 Per capita GDP (x 1000 euros) 22.4 6.5 10.1 36.4 0.69* -0.05 -0.12* -0.17* 
    
6 % of elderly residents (>65 yo) 19.8 3.0 12.9 28.0 0.36* 0.20* -0.34* -0.18* 0.42* 
   
7 
Per-capita public health deficit (x 1 
000 euros) 46.9 83.5 -74.5 644.1 0.33* -0.13* 0.22* -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 
  
8 Left government 7.1 5.7 0.0 12.0 0.11 -0.23* -0.11 -0.05 0.11 0.11 -0.02 
 
9 Turnaround plan 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.34* -0.02 0.25* -0.24* -0.05* 0.02 0.29* -0.13* 
 
               
 *  p < 0.05 
 
Table 3: Estimation results 
 Dependent variable: Ln of per capita public health expenditures 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Public outsourcing (%) 
 
  0.373**  0.313* 
Public outsourcing (%) – squared 
 
  -0.428**  -0.477** 
Private outsourcing (%) 
 
   0.285* 0.279* 
Private outsourcing (%) – squared 
 
   -0.671* -0.840* 
Pub. outs. x Priv. outs.  
 
    0.605* 
Total per capita hospital beds 
 
 0.023** 0.019** 0.020** 0.017** 
Per capita GDP (x 1000 euros) 
 
 -0.009** -0.009** -0.010** -0.010** 
% of elderly residents (> 65 yo) 
 
 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.006† 
Per-capita public health deficit (x 1000 euros) 
 
 0.282** 0.293** 0.284** 0.283** 
Left government 
 
 -0.002** -0.001* -0.002** -0.001* 
Turnaround plan 
 
 -0.009 -0.015† -0.009 -0.016† 
Yearly dummies 
 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 6.915** 6.822** 6.782** 6.837** 6.817** 
      
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 
Number of regions 21 21 21 21 21 
R-squared (within)  0.970 0.975 0.980 0.980 0.983 
Log-likelihood chi2 test for nested 
models (d.o.f.)  - 
 146.32** 11.11** 15.05** 
15.05**  
(vs. Model 3)  
8.91*  
(vs. Model 4) 
 (6) (2) (2) (3) 
      
†   p < 0.10 
*  p < 0.05 
**p < 0.01 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS  
The conclusions of this thesis are a reflection of the findings discussed above.  
From the discussion of the three essays, it is clear that the major external influences on public sector 
organizational changes remain business managerialism, although a different vintage from the 
original NPM-influences. The core NPM envisaged an entrepreneurial, market-oriented society, 
with a light presence of government on top. Specifically, the northern European variant foresaw a 
citizens’ state with extensive participation facilitated by a modernized system of public law that 
would guarantee right and duties, while proponents of the central European variant favoured a 
professional state, modern, efficient and flexible, yet stull uniquely identified with the “higher 
purposes” of the general interest (Torres, 2004; Pollit and Bouckeart, 2011). However, the precision 
of the NPM model is questionable. Indeed, intentional reform paths promoting public sector change 
have developed unsystematically across public administrations, often living uncompleted scenarios 
(e.g., decentralization and federalism in the INHS). Literature suggests that frequently, the patterns 
of reform are very rough and approximate, for both political and organizational reasons (Ongaro, 
2009; Pollitt and Bouckeart, 2011).  
Politically, governments change and may hold different visions of the future, so that, following 
elections, certain types of reform are de-emphasized and other types given greater salience, or 
because of contingent political demand or pressures represented by external socio-economic forces. 
Indeed, trouble for governments may alter the trajectory of reform. For example, in my dissertation 
the economic, financial and fiscal crisis started in 2008 heightened the need for economies and cuts, 
and altered the balance of most European countries with regard to their reform priorities, bringing to 
the fore the trade-off between short-term and long-term goals (Pandey, 2010).  
Organizational factors may also intrude to spoil the possibility of a reform patters. Procedural rules, 
institutional structures, or cultural norms at organization and system level shape the direction and 
intensity of reform implementation. However, there are frequently implementation difficulties, and 
these can persuade governments to change instruments or to soften the reform. For example, during 
the marketization of public healthcare service delivery in Italy the rhetoric of competition was the 
main driver while the presence of private providers was not homogeneous across the regions and 
regulation was scant. Thus, an unbalanced and unstructured system emerged and central 
government soon retreated from the general marketization and moved back towards closely 
managed providers in an effort to avoid inconsistent patterns of health-care service provision. 
Apart from the theoretical and methodological difficulties of studying and analysing unsystematic 
and unpredictable path of reform change in the public sector, the three essays highlight some cross-
cutting themes about NPM-style reform in the healthcare sector that followed decentralization and 
competition frameworks.  
First, is the phenomenon of integration, de-integration and re-integration in public sector practice. 
Re-integration particularly appears as the ultimate opportunity to put back together many elements 
that NPM separated out into discrete corporate hierarchies, offloading onto local or decentralized 
civil servants (and citizens) the burden of organizing and delivery public services into usable 
packages. Re-integration approaches, as the literature suggests, are not simple reruns of the old 
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centralization phases of centralizations/decentralization cycles, rather they represent an antithetical 
response to the NPM thesis (Dunlevy et al., 2006). Indeed, re-establishing central processes has 
been important to reaffirm the role of the state as the main facilitator of solutions, to save duplicated 
multiple hierarchies (e.g., in public procurement processes), also to help launching large-country 
initiatives or government-wide programs (e.g., patient medical records) and, more importantly, to 
preserve the idea of a public service with a distinctive status, culture and conditions moving away 
from the radical marketizers and anti-state minimizers (Pollitt and Bouckeart, 2011).  
As presented in the first and last essay, the rollback of decentralization has been achieved in the 
Italian healthcare sector via re-assimilation of budgetary and expenditure control competencies and 
responsibilities into cohesive central departments (at regional and national level) (Essay 1), and re-
imposition of cooperative structure on healthcare service delivery that were previously encouraged 
to be competitive (Essay 3). Specifically, in the case of the INHS, the system was designed to be a 
very integrated system, with virtually all services under the control of Local Health Authorities 
(ASLs). Along the reform trends of the 1990s the INHS was partly de-integrated, mainly by making 
hospitals independent of ASLs with a moderate attempt to promote a quasi-market, to better 
recognize the role of private providers and because the idea of the purchaser-provider split inspired 
Italian policy making. Currently, however, most regional policies seem to have returned to 
integration, namely through the re-attribution of some hospitals to ASLs, the concentration of 
purchasing activities in regional or supra-organizational entities and the enlargement of the size of 
ASLs52. In addition, in the last ten years most regional authorities have strengthened control over 
their providers and have increased their grip over provider organizations, which in turn, have lost 
most of their organizational autonomy. Also, this trend towards re-integration has gained fuel 
probably due to the general conditions of austerity and the search for savings.  
Indeed, a second emerging reform subtheme across European public administrations is the 
aggressive squeezing of costs. This is true almost across all public sectors and countries. In the last 
five years European healthcare systems have been targeted by a number of policies aimed at 
containing or even reducing health expenditure without reducing the provision of health services to 
patients. To a certain extent, these policies have been effective as expenditure are now under strict 
control but due to the long period of cost cutbacks there are signals that the economic crisis has 
worsened some health outcome indicators and increased demand for a variety of services (e.g., 
waiting times are on the rise and continuity of care and intermediate care for chronic diseases). 
Thus, the current largest challenge facing health systems is to achieve budgetary goals without 
reducing the provision of health services to patients and assure homogeneity of level and quality of 
service provision across healthcare providers. Specifically, a critical challenge for the Italian 
healthcare system includes ensuring equity across regions, where gaps in service provision and 
health system performance persist as well as ensuring the quality of professionals managing 
healthcare facilities, promoting group practice and other integrated care organizational models in 
primary care, and ensuring that the concentration of organizational control by regions of health care 
providers does not stifle innovation.   
52 The re-integration of healthcare service is also due to the search for better combined care pathways that can overcome barriers 
deriving from the involvement of different organizations in treating the same case. It is clear that patients increasingly need a variety 
of providers working in a co-ordinated way and that such co-ordination is essential to ensure quality of care as well as cost 
containment. 
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Annex 1 Historical background and recent reforms in Italy’s health care system. 
1861-1920 Autonomous mutual aid associations are established for artisans and workers; the Catholic Church 
and charitable institutions establish several health care providers; provincial and municipal networks 
provide social assistance to the needy and disabled. 
1898 Insurance for occupational accidents become compulsory for the first time. 
1904, 1917 Insurance becomes compulsory in industry and agriculture, respectively. 
1923 The right to hospital care for the needy, indigent population is guaranteed for the first time. 
1925 A national body in charge of insurance for the employees of local authorities is created (INADEL). 
1926 A small number of centres for cancer diagnostic testing are created. 
1927 Provincial authorities for tuberculosis treatment are created, and tuberculosis insurance becomes 
compulsory. 
1926-1929 Health care provisions for workers become mandatory for the government to approve collective labor 
force agreements. 
1942 A national body is created to guarantee social insurance and health care for public employees 
(ENPAS). 
1943 A national body for private employees’ health care insurance is created (INAM). 
1958 An independent Ministry of Health is created. 
1968 Public institutions providing hospital care are established as autonomous entities (Law 132/1968). 
1974-1975 Responsibility for hospital management is transferred to the regions (Laws 386/1974 and 382/1975). 
1978 A national health service (SSN) is established by Law 833. Health insurance funds are abolished 
(First reform of Italian health care). 
1992-1993 Second reform of the SSN (Legislative Decrees 502/1992 and 517/1993). Devolution of health care to 
regions begins; managerial autonomy granted to local health authorities (ASLs) and hospitals (AOs); 
elements of an internal market are  introduced. 
1994 First National Health Plan (1994–1996). The plan defines national health targets and establishes that a 
uniform core benefit package (‘essential levels of assistance, LEAs) should be guaranteed to all 
citizens. 
1997 Further steps towards federalism: Law 51/1997 devolves some key political powers to the regions; 
Law 446/1997 initiates the process of fiscal federalism. 
1998 Second National Health Plan (1998–2000). 
1999 Third reform of the SSN (Decree 229/1999). Further development of devolution; strengthening of 
cooperation and regulation to partially reorient the internal market; establishment of tools to define 
the core benefit package; regulation of the introduction of clinical guidelines for quality in health 
care. 
2000 Decree 56/2000 replaces (in theory) the National Health Fund with a National Solidarity Fund; plan 
for fiscal federalism to be operative in 2013. 
2001 Constitutional Law No. 3 modifies the second part of the Italian Constitution (Title V), giving regions 
with more powers. 
Law 405/2001 introduces new regional governance tools and stronger responsibility in the control of 
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health care expenditure. 
2003 Third National Health Plan (2003–2005). 
2005 Memorandum of understanding between the state and the regions reforms the health care financing 
system and introduces new mandatory financial rules. 
2006 Fourth National Health Plan (2006–2008). In June the newly formed Centre-left government outlines 
the policy programme A New Deal for Health. National Budget Law 2007 introduces financial 
turnaround (recovery) for regions with deficits 
2009 Law 42/2009 provides the framework for fiscal federalism. In the following years, a series of decrees 
define the distribution of local taxes to the tiers of government and the criteria for central equalization 
and redistribution of funds. 
2012 A spending review of the national budget includes cuts to health spending and a reduction of hospital 
beds per inhabitant. 
2012 Decree 158 (“Balduzzi Law”) modernizes the SSN on several levels: continuity of care; selection by 
merit of general directors and head physicians; simplifications for homeopathic and innovative 
pharmaceuticals; rationalized pharmaceutical and capital spending. 
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